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INTRODUCTION 
The causes of racial segregation in northern cities have 
been the subject of great debate and endless study. Generally 
three broad theories dominate. One is that ethnic preference 
is the single most important force producing racial segrega-
tion (Gans, 1962). For example, people choose to live and 
associate with others with whom they can culturally and ethnic-
ally identify. A second theory, whose proponents do not nec-
essarily discount the first theory, holds that racial segre-
gation is principally the result of economics: the large num-
ber of dirt poor, unskilled blacks who migrated from the south 
were doomed to end up living in the most undesirable sections 
of our inner cities (Banfield, 1974:90). Moreover, their lack 
of income and salable skills made escape from ramshackle, 
crowded tenements virtually impossible. A third theory, which 
grew in popularity following WWII when the social sciences 
attracted greater attention, downplays the importance of eth-
nicity and income and suggests that.minorities are instead 
the clear victims of racial discrimination (Myrdal, 1944), 
an element not considered in the other two theories. 
Obviously each theory helps explain different &s-
pects of segregation. Furthermore, a wealth of data has been 
accumulated to support each view. At any one time or place, 
the components of one theory may be more significant than 
another. Taken alone, however, no one theory can explain 
the pervasiveness of segregation that still exists today. 
The theories therefore overlap and feed upon each other. 
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The position of this theisis is that segregation in the 
beginning was largely voluntary, caused by both ethnic ties 
and economic necessity. Later on, however, as Myrdal wrote 
more than 35 years ago, "Practically all ••• Negro concentra-
tion is ••• forced s·egregation, independent of the factors 
which have brought it about" (1944:621). Racial discrimina-
tion has circumscribed black housing areas as has no other 
force. 
This thesis looks at one form of racial discrimination, 
racially restrictive covenants and agreements that were used 
to exclude minorities (particularily blacks) from living in 
white residential areas. The focus will be on the Kansas 
City Metropolitan Region (KCMR). Racial covenants were enforc-
ed in Kansas City, as in most other northern cities, froM 
approximately 1914 until they were ruled unlawful irt 1948 by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark case, Shel1ey v. Kraemer 
(334 U.S.1). The interpretation of this decision caused consid~ 
erable debate, howeverr and the observation of racial covenants 
continued for several more years. 
Racial covenants established a pattern of segregation that 
profoundly influenced the housing choice of blacks living in 
Kansas City, the effect of which continues today. Without 
the common observance of these covenants, residential segrega-
tion would be far less pervasive today. Their widespread 
usage influenced the entire housing industry and helped to 
institutionalize-segregated housing. Every phase of the 
housing industry was eventually covered by racial covenants: 
their presence was required for loans to developers and home 
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builders; realtors strictly observed them; government policy 
adhered to them; Title companies required them; and white 
residents accepted them as protection against future black 
residential movement and insurance against declining property 
values. By the late '30s, the racial covenant was routinely 
accepted as an integral part of any housing transaction. 
Racial covenants not only determined where blacks could 
or could not live, they produced other lasting and profound 
effects as well: 
- they provided white citizens with tacit legal approval 
to discriminate in housing; blacks who challenged the 
validity of the covenants were considered law breakers; 
- as long as the covenants were ruled as valid agreements, 
they deprived blacks of their constitutional rights 
under the 14th Amendment. 
- they perpetuated inferior housing conditions for blacks, 
who, growing in number, were confined to a limited terri-
tory; 
- black demand for housing was so acute, and normal hous-
ing choice so limited, that blacks spilled over into 
bordering white neighborhoods, thus creating the phenom-
enon of transitional neighborhoods, white flight, and 
the block by block movement of blacks as the ghetto ex-
panded; 
-· they prevented a significant percentage of today's black 
population from accumulating equity through home owner-
ship; 
- they perpetuated misunderstanding and animosity between 
the races; 
~v~n though racial covenants were ruled unenforcible more 
than 30 years ago, their status remained uncertain for many 
more years. A series of court cases (the most recent of which 
was in 1972) and government actions all tried to accomplish 
what Shelley could not: end the influence of racial covenants. 
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METHODOLOGY 
The research for this thesis includes a five month survey 
of racial covenants on file at the recorder of deeds offices 
in Jackson, Clay, Cass, and Platte Counties in Missouri, and 
Johnson and Wyandotte Counties in Kansas. 1 The process used 
to gather information was to review, as thoroughly as possible, 
each recorded plat, warranty deed, and declaration of restric-
tions from 1910 to 1954. A random survey was made of earlier 
and later years. (See Appendix A for a description of the re-
view process.) Documents earlier than 1920 were generally in 
such a deteriorated condition that no thorough review of them 
was possible. Enough information was available, however, to 
conclude that very few restrictions were written before WWI and 
probably none before around 1914, the year in which the first 
ones were discovered in the survey. The last explicit racial 
restrictions in the KCMR were written in the late '60s in 
"exclusive" developments. 
From the outset, the purpose of the survey was to determine, 
first, how extensively :restrictions were written in the KCMR; 
and second, if complete coverage, or at least extensive cover-
age was necessary to effectively exclude blacks from white 
neighborhoods. In the Beginning, the assunption was that they 
were "extensively written in the KCMR. This was based partly 
on a preliminary conversation with Robert Freilich, a professor 
of law at the University of Missouri at Kansas City and a well 
known land-use authority (.Interview, 1977). Freilich, who has 
done research on exclusionary land-use practices in Kansas City, 
has examined racial restrictions in Kansas City (1971) and believed 
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that they did, indeed, "blanket" the metropolitan area. 
In addition, a title examiner from the Chicago Title Com-
pany, who has extensive experience reviewing title deeds in 
Jackson County, estimated that about 95 percent of Kansas City, 
Missouri's subdivisions built prior to the early '50s had ex-
plicit racial restrictions (Dwyer interview, 1977). On the 
other hand, he said that only 35 to 50 percent of the eastern 
and southern Jackson County subdivisions contained such restric-
tions. The main reason for the difference is that areas out-
side of Kansas City, Missouri, prior to the early '50s, were 
largely rural and the threat of black neighbors remote. 
What does it mean to say that the KCMP.. was "blanketed" with 
racial restrictions? Does it mean that every house in every 
white neighborhood was racially restricted? Does it mean that 
a substantial percentage of white homes were restricted? Or 
does it simply require that enough homes be restricted so as 
to effectively blanket white neighborhoods? Could the mere 
presence of a few racial covenants in white neighborhoods be 
enough to dissuade black homebuyers? 
These questions were also considered along with the immense 
prospect of finding all of the restrictions. Given the large 
number of homes involved and the frequent turnover of home-
owners from 1914 to 1954, the task was virtually impossible. 
Since restrictions often appeared each time a house changed 
hands, early thought of pinpointing the location of each 
restriction within a subdivision was quickly abandoned. After 
much consideration, the following assumption was therefore made: 
if but one restricted home was found within a subdivision, the 
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entire subdivision was considered restricted to black occupancy. 
The rationale for this assumption is discussed in greater detail 
in the section describing the results of the survey on page 107. 
A second survey was made of the Kansas City Call newspaper, 
a black weekly published since 1917. Every issue was reviewed 
from 1923, the first year available on micro-film at the Kansas 
City, Missouri, Public Library, to 1954. 2 The Call provided the 
basis for many of the conclusions reached in this thesis. It 
is a remarkable history of black life, both in Kansas City and 
nationally (much of the Call's emphasis was on the latter after 
about 1933). 
A third resource was a series of interviews with several 
long-time black residents of Kansas City. Although the purpose 
of these interviews concerned another closely related issue, 
they supplied added knowledge about life in Kansas City prior 
to 1954 when racial agreements were a serious concern to all 
blacks. 
Fourth, a review was made of case law, particularly for Mis-
souri and Kansas, relevant cases in other states, and the few 
key cases that reached the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Lastly, a search was made of law journals, review, and 
other literature available on the subject of racial agreements. 
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DEFINITIONS 
The generic term, restrictive covenant, covers all methods 
used to limit the sale or rental of property. A covenant is 
defined as "an agreement ••• or promise of two or more parties, 
by deed in writing ... by which either of the parties pledges 
himself to the other that something ••• shall be done ••• " (Black's 
Law Dictionary). In common parlance it is "any agreement." 
Although the language of racial covenants varied somewhat, 
its objective always remained the same: to make housing develop-
ments more attractive to whites by excluding other races. 
Three types of racial covenants were common: those that restric-
ted the sale, lease, conveyance to, or ownership of property 
by any memoer of an excluded group: those that prohibited use 
or occupancy: and those that prohibited both ownership and 
occupancy (Scanlon, 1948: 160). The method most commonly,used 
in Kansas City was the type prohibiting occupancy. 
Typically, the language of restrictive covenants prohibiting 
race would state that 
no portion of said property ••• shall be conveyed by deed 
to any person other than a member of the caucasian race 
••• nor shall any person or persons not of the caucasian 
race occupy any portion of said premises, except for do-
mestic servants (Jackson County Record Books, Book 3004, 
p. 70}. 
Racial covenants always excluded blacks, but the language 
used to accamplish this purpose varied somewhat. Among the 
more common terms included were: "Negroes," "of African de-
scent," "of Negro descent," "colored person," "Ethiopian race," 
and so forth. Some covenants specified a list of several minor-
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ities including Negroes, liexicans, Spanish-Americans, and Ori-
entals. Others cited Jews. Still others contained restrictions 
barring Armenians, Hindus, Syrians, and "former residents of 
the Turkish Empire." Even Italians were barred on occasion. 
Yet another variant was the exclusion of "persons whose blood 
is not entirely of the white race," a rather nebulous, catch-
all phrase. In short, racial covenants covered a spectrum as 
broad as predjudice itself. 
Despite the differing language styles, disputes over racial 
definitions were infrequent concerning blacks because their 
identification was not usually difficult. Questions over who 
was a "Negro" or "colored" person were rarely ever challenged 
in the courts. Michigan, however, is one state that established 
·the precedent that "land not sold to jews or persons of objec-
tionable nationality" was too uncertain and vague for political 
action. {Re Drumond Wren, 4 D.L.R. 674 (1945)). This argument 
was used in Sipes v. McGhee, a companion case heard jointly with 
Shelley, when M:G1ee argued, unsuccessfully, that the covenant 
language, except those of caucasion race," was also void due 
to its uncertainty {Voss, 1959:134). 
Generally, however, all that was necessary to have a bind-
ing agreement was to make it clear that the desire was to ex-
clude non-whites {.Ibid. 7). The use of one of the other vari-
ous terms did not need scientific verification when the intent 
was explicity to exclude "Negroes." Moreover, covenants against 
other minorities in Kansas City were riot commonly written. The 
northeast section of Kansas City, Missouri, wrote covenants 
prohibiting Italian occupancy, but there is no indication that 
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they were ever actively enforced against anyone but blacks. 
Racial covenants promised different, but similar, types 
of penalty for the violation of a covenant. Generally the 
signatories had "granted to all others an easement in his or 
her property1" a violation by one owner tl-ierefore gave the 
others a cause of action (.Meade v. Dennistone, 173 Md. 295 
(1938)). 
REMEDIES TO ENFORCE COVENANTS 
In the KCMR, every racial covenant law suit occurred in 
transitional neighborhoods in Kansas City, Missouri, where 
blacks were spilling over into white districts. The chances 
of a black moving to an outlying location were remote. Inter-
estingly, law suits often did not include black litigants and 
it was common for suits to pit white against white. At other 
times, a white would file a suit against both the white seller 
and the black buyer. Neither blacks nor whites were pleased 
with the uneasy situation. Blacks wanted to move into restric-
ted areas and could not1 many whites wanted to sell to blacks 
so they could escape what they feared would ultimately be a 
black neighborhood. These circmnstances led to cases that 
followed two forms: those where whites sought to get out from 
under the covenant by seeking an injunction that would~.decree 
a "cloud on the title1" and those where whites wanted to enforce 
the restrictions. Unfortunately, caught in the middle were 
blacks who only wanted the opportunity to improve their housing 
choice. 
Getting out from under a restrictive agreement was diffi-
cult in that it required the approval of all of the other 
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signers of the covenant--an unlikely proposition. Moreover, 
the courts were hesitent to overturn a covenant, believing 
that they were "valid and solemn contracts and should not be 
lightly set aside" (Grady v. Garland, 89 Fed.2d 817, (1937)). 
To alleviate this fear, "escape clauses" were written into 
some agreements to assure white residents that if a black 
moved into a neighborhood and stayed for a specified period 
of time, the agreement was nullified (Voss, 1959:11). On 
other occasions, a restrictive agreement did not go into effect 
until certain specified conditions were satisfied, such as 
enough signatures to render the proposal a reasonably effec-
tive legal document C-Ibid. 11). 
Remedies were nonetheless occasionally granted. In one 
rather extreme example, the court cancelled the deeds, awarded 
court costs and attorney's fees to the plaintiff, and placed 
a lien on the lots involved (Lyons v. Wallen, 133 Pac.2d 555 
(.1942)). There are also several examples in the Jackson 
County record books where a group of white residents had racial 
restrictions on their property set aside, when the terms of 
the covenants expired, thus freeing them to sell to blacks. 3 
While no law suits were involved here, occasionally white 
home owners petitioned the Jackson County Circuit Court to 
cancel their restrictions so they could sell to blacks and 
avoid law suits for doing so (KC Call, September 26, 1947). 
Th~ following are examples of the different types of remedy 
a plaintiff might seek in an attempt to have a racial covenant 
enforced. 
·Injunction - This was the most cormnon and practical method 
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used in Kansas City to prevent the completion of a proposed 
sale to a black. A typical covenant of this type would state: 
In case of violation of any of the respective or collec-
tive restrictions the proprietor, his heirs, assigns, 
executors, administrators, or any subsequent owner of 
lots in this addition shall have the right or injunc-
tion and order mandatory or otherwise, to enforce com-
pliance therewith (Wyandotte County ~ecord Books, Book 
951, p. 189). 
Forfeiture - Another commonly used procedure was to seek an 
order forfeiting the sale of the property. Typical language 
would state that the "party of the second part cannot transfer 
above described premises to Negroes without forfeiture of agree-
ment" (Ibid., Book 663, p.164}. 
Reversion - Closely related to forfeiture were covenants that 
guaranteed a reversion of property in case of a violation. In 
Missouri, this precedent was established in 1918 in Kohler v. 
Rowland when the Court held that violations of covenants "shall 
revert to the granter or sellers (275 u.s. 323 (1926)). Typical 
language for reverter clauses would state: 
••• said land ••• shall not at any time ••• be sold, conveyed 
leased or the possession thereof in any manner.delivered 
to a Negro or any persons whose ancestors.are or were of 
African race, and in case the covenants at anytime be 
broken by them, then, by reason of said violations, all 
••• lands hereby conveyed shall immediately revert to and 
revest in the granter herein, its successors and assigns 
(Wyandotte County Record Books, Book 609, p.547). 
Dama·ges - A less frequently used remedy was to sue for damages 
in order to punish the violators (Clark v. Vaughn, 131 Kan. 
438 (1938)). This approach became popular after -Shelley, how-
ever, when other remedies were rendered unlawful. The question 
of damages was not legally resolved until 1953 in the Barrows 
·v. ·Jackson case (346 U.S. 249). As a result, during this five 
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year period, suits involving damages became quite common. They 
granted power to anyone owning property in the same development 
to sue for damages. Although the damages approach might appear 
the most practical remedy, prior to Shelley they were not com-
monly used because of the difficulty in measuring the damages. 
An example of a damages remedy is as follows: 
if the parties hereto, or any of them, or their heirs or 
assigns, shall violate or attempt to violate any of the 
covenants herein it shall be lawful for any other person 
or persons owning any real property situated in said 
development or subdivision to prosecute any proceedings 
at law or in equity against the person or persons violating 
or attempting to violate any such covenant and either 
to prevent him or them from so doing or to recover damages 
or other dues for such violation (Wyandotte County Record 
Books, Book 983:246). 
CHAPTER 1- EARLY HISTORY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN KANSAS CITY 
THE SLAVERY ISSUE 
It was through the institution of slavery that this country 
set the framework for future racial relations and the continuing 
pattern of racial segregation. Freedom and liberty for all were 
foremost on the minds of the continental congress, but their 
exalted ideals did not include black~. Nor did the the aboli-
tionist movement. Although abhoring the cruelty and dehumani-
zation of slavery, as a rule, they did not want to extend full 
and equal rights to blacks (Rawley, 1969). 
Slavery was first brought to Missouri in 1749 when Sieur 
Renault, a French trader, brought 500 pure-blooded Guinese 
Negroes to the territory (KC Star, September 29, 1970:14F). 
By 1803, there were between two and three thousand slaves lo-
... 
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cated exclusively in the eastern and southern portions of the 
present state boundaries (Trexler, 1914:281). Population data 
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during this period is highly questionable, but Table 1 below, 
which was taken from both census records (started in 1B60) and 
property tax records, shows a steady growth of slavery in 
Missouri. 
Table 1 - GROWTH OF SLAVERY IN MISSOURI TERRITORY: 1810 - 1860 
Free 
Year Whites Blacks Slaves 
1810 17,227 607 3,011 
1820 54,903 376 9,797 
1830 115,364 569 25,091 
1840 322,295 1,478 57,891 
1850 592,004 2,618 87,422 
1860 1,063,489 3,572 114,931 
(Ibid., 281) 
Missouri was not well suited to "extensive" farming, such 
-as cotton growing, which depended upon a large supply of labor-
ers. ·consequently, the number of slaves increased, lmt not 
' as rapidly in proportion to whites. Most of the increase. took 
place in the western counties along the Missouri river where 
hemp and tobacco were grown, crops well suited to sla'Ve labor. 
Nearly all labor in the state, however, was performed by slaves, 
but more for domestic than commercial purposes; only lllltere hemp 
was grown were slaves employed as in the south (Ibid •• 34). 
The first blacks arrived in Kansas City in 1812 wit:h the 
earliest white settlers when Francois Chouteau established a 
trading post within the present city boundaries (Webster, 1949: 
7). Chouteau's use of slave labor for river boat work, then 
a principal means of transportation, caused early racial con-
troversy. One reason for this controversy pertained ti> the 
fact that the river boats made escape for slaves much easier 
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and more tempting due to Missouri's precarious location, sur-
rounded, as it was, on three sides by free territory. Owners 
were also bound by state law in Missouri to recapture lost 
slaves and were fined for the failure to do so (Trexler 1914: 
30) • 
From the beginning, slavery was a major issue in Missouri. 
Pro-slavery agitation occurred principally in the western hemp 
growing counties along the Missouri river where the slave pop-
ulation was the largest. In 1860, the slave population of the 
western counties (Platte, Clay, Jackson, Ray, Lafayette, and 
Saline) was 23.5 percent of their total population and 13 per-
cent for the entire state (KC Star, September 29, 1970:14F). 
The 1860 census sha-lS that in Jackson County alone, where Kan-
sas City is located, 3,316 slaves were divided among 736 slave 
owners, amounting to 4.5 slaves per land owner (Ibid.}. 
Pro-slave forces in Missouri hoped to extend slavery into 
Kansas, not only for profit motives and the extension of the 
South's economic and political base, but more importantly, to 
allow Missourians to protect existing slave property endangered 
by the presence of a free territory directly across their 
border (Rawley, 1979:80). Slave owners were bitter about the 
loss of slaves to Kansas, which by the late 1850s was consider-
able. Millions of dollars in slave property were lost (Trex-
ler, 1914:32). This was so much of a problem that many owners 
around Kansas City started selling their slaves to southern 
owners (Ibid.,39}. 
In no other part of the country was the question of slavery 
debated more forcefully than along the Kansas and Missouri 
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border. When the New England Emigrant Aid Company was set 
up cy New Englanders in the 1850s (to make profits from hotels, 
mills, etc., and only incidently to aid slaves to freedom 
(Ibid., 81)), pro-slave forces around Kansas City counte1~ed by 
forming numerous secret societies dedicated to the cause of 
preserving slavery (Nevins, 1947:309). Among the more active 
groups were those found in the cities of Westport and Indepen-
dence, both noted hot-beds for pro-slavery agitation. 
In his history of J{ansas City, Theodore Brown writes that 
the City was in the midst of this conflict. Its border loca-
tion presented its citizens with a dilemma. The people in 
power were pulled one way by their cultural ties to slavery 
and another by economic aims (1963:97). Most of the City's 
leaders (31 of 39) were slave holders and merchants from the 
South and slavery therefore represented a sizeable investment 
for them. Kansas City's businesses, however, were being by-
passed for St. Joseph and Leavenworth due to continual threats 
of violence caused by the slavery dispute. Bro~m notes that 
these incidents, which were heavily publicized in newspapers 
back East, discouraged businessmen and traders from coming to 
Kansas City. As a result, future growth of the City, and the 
personal profits of its merchants, depended upon the ability 
of city leaders to stop the violence, protect property, and 
keep trade flowing through the city. 
Rawley proposes that anti-slavery support in Kansas and 
Missouri took two _general directions (1969). First, there were 
the "free soilers" in Kansas territory who wanted to write the 
exclusion of slavery into the proposed state constitution, 
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thereby prohibiting the plantation system which was consider-
ed alien to their way of farming and living. As such, their 
motive had little to do with the welfare of blacks. On the 
other hand, there was a strong abolitionist movement derived 
from religious groups in the northeast who had come to settle 
in Kansas. They believed slavery was unjust and their goal 
was to aid both runaway and freed-slaves by transporting them 
into the state, hoping they could establish communities of 
their own. As with earlier abolitionists, however, Rawley 
believes there was no intention of bringing blacks into the 
mainstream of white society. Their efforts, including an 
underground railway running from Nebraska into Lawrence, led 
to countless raids by Missourians to recapture slaves. "Jay-
-hawks" countered by carrying out guerrilla warfare against 
Missouri farms that held slaves. The period became popularly 
known as "bloody-Kansas." 
BLACK RESIDENTIAL MOVEMENT 
After the Civil War, approximately 1500 freed blacks, 
mostly from Missouri territory, came to Kansas City and settled 
along Charlotte and Campbell streets between 10th and 11th 
streets. Another pocket located around 6th and May and 8th 
and Central, but within a few short years, businesses pushed 
this second location eastward to the first one (KC Call, 
November 21, 1930}. (See Figure 1.) This area was referred 
to as "East Kansas," and it ran roughly from Holmes on the 
west, to Woodland on the east, and from the river on the north 
to a varying line along 5th and 10th streets on the south 
(Martin, 1913:90). 
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By 1875, many blacks were also living in the "West Bottoms," 
the present location of the American Royal and much industrial 
activity, where they found work in packing plants after white 
employees went on strike at the Armour Company. By the 1880s 
and '90s, however, most of this land was taken up by industrial 
expansion and a sizeable black movement out of this location 
began (KC Call, July 26, 1928). Some blacks moved to the East 
Kansas neighborhoods and others went southward along State 
Line Avenue (where Rosedale is presently located). The prin-
cipal movement, however, was eastward between Troost and Wood-
land where the main black section, the "Bowery" ·was rapidly 
forming (Brown and Dorsett, 1978:96). 
In the 1870s, other blacks lived just south of Westport 
Road (where St. Luke's Hospital now stands), near 53rd and 
Agnes, and 58th and Montgall (Martin, 1913:92). Many blacks 
were living along Paseo from 12th to 17th street in 1880, but 
whites bought them out due to the location's beauty (KC Call, 
July 26, 1928). (Perhaps the only instance, until recently, 
where whites wanted to buy property from blacks.) A few years 
later, the same property would revert back to blacks, as whites 
were anxious to move farther south to escape the growing black 
community. 
East Kansas was comprised of two crowded pockets: Belvi-
dere and Hick's Hollow. By 1910, Belvidere was generally bor-
dered by Holmes on the west to Tracy on the east, and from First 
···3treet on the north to 5th and 8th Streets on the south. Hick's 
Hollow, straight east of Belvidere , was roughly bordered by Vine 
on the west and Prospect on the east, and from First to Inde-
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pendence Avenue (Martin, 1913:90). 
These two pockets became known as Kansas City's first 
"problem" neighborhoods. The residences were made up exclu-
sively of worthless dilapidated tenements, built originally 
for white occupancy, that the City would not condemn and their 
white landlords could not afford to repair (Ibid.). Over 
1,000 blacks lived here by 1900 (Ibid.). Ward data indicates 
that its population peaked sometime between 1900 and 1920, when 
it reached more than 4,000. Many blacks then started moving 
south to the Bowery. 
Only rough estimates can be made from the ward data be-
cause, as political boundaries, they change regularly. Never-
theless, Kansas City, I!issouri, ward boundaries in 1900 and 
·-1920 are closely aligned and the pattern of eastern and southern 
movement is verifiable. For example, 30 percent (5,179) of 
all blacks lived west of Oak Street in 1900; only 13 percent 
(4,004) lived in this area by 1920 (U.S. Census). Black move-
ment had definitely turned eastward, more than doubling in the 
Bowery. The primary reason for the movement was the rapid 
post war commercial and industrial growth occurring in and 
around downtown Kansas City, Missouri. Similarly, in 1900, 
nine percent (1,665) of the black population lived south of 20th 
Street, but in 1920 it had increased to 25 percent (7,541) 
(Ibid.). 
As a result, by around 1920, the Bowery had become the 
largest black location in the KCMR. D~ring the '20s, the 
Bowery extended from Admiral Boulevard (just south of Inde-
pendence Avenue) southward to a varying line from 18th to 25th 
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Streets, generally bordered by Troost on the west and Paseo 
on the east (Comstock, 1936:2). Ward data for 1920 shows 
that approximately 60 to 70 percent of the black population 
in Kansas City, Missouri, lived in this general section at 
this time. Like Belvidere and Hick's Hollow, the Bowery was 
largely made up of apartments, most of which had been built 
for whites. When the white landlords could not fill many of 
them with white occupants (most were less than half full), 
they increased the rents and opened them up to blacks who anx-
iously moved in. So much so that terribly crowded and unsani-
tary conditions resulted (Martin, 1913:90). 
Before 1900, most of Kansas City, Missouri's middle class, 
including many blacks, lived in McGee's Addition (Brown and 
Dorsett, 1978:45). (See Fig. 1) Neither rich nor poor lived __ 
here. Development of the subdivision began near the present __ 
location of the public library and county Court House at 12th 
and McGee. It ultimately was bounded by Main, Holmes, 12th and 
18th Streets (Tuttle, Woodward and Ayers, 1923:plats 14-15). 
The southern expansion of McGee's was halted by McClure Flats, 
a terrible slum that consisted of two sol-id block like buildings 
running up and down Grand and Mc Gee from 19th to 20th. At the 
time, there were no ordinances requiring set-backs or open 
space and McClure Flats occupied 80 percent of the ground area 
(Board of Public Welfare, mo~, -1912:42). Living quarters were on one side 
of the street and shops on the other. -McGee's Addition eventually deteriorated 
to the sa:ire slmrrlike rondH:.iGnS as McClure's Piace (Bro,m-Ibrsett, 1978: 45). 
Asa Martin's survey of 1913 found that the 22 blacks making 
up the heart of the Bowery were occupied by 4,295 people (90). 
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The same survey showed that less than one-half of Kansas City's 
blacks had water, and less than one~fourth had toilets. Priv-
ies sat right next to tenements and were usually shared by sev-
eral families; the most notable instance being 19 families for 
one privy (Ibid. ,43). 
Shortly after the turn of the Century, cities across the 
country were making surveys that documented the disgraceful 
housing conditions found in urban centers. Perhaps this was 
in response to Lewis Hines's influential "slum" photography 
which enlightened the public, as never before, to the need for 
some type of housing program. Kansas City carried out such a 
survey and published its findings in 1912 (Ibid.). 
No racial distinctions were made and the Hines-like photo-
graphs (a most impressive aspect of the study) show many 
poor white slum areas as well as black, 
Asa Martin's survey, also in 1913, showed that of the 
40,000 property owners in Kansas City, only 800 were blacks 
(30), Most importantly, Martin points out that areas where 
blacks were allowed to own property was significantly smaller 
than the areas in which they were permitted to live (Ibid.,34). 
Therefore, blacks were not only restricted in a geographical 
sense, they were also confined to rental properties because 
single family residences were not open to them. Martin indi-
cates that the homeowning district for blacks before WWI was 
located between Lydia, Kansas Avenue, 12th and 27th, but not 
continuously. He provides the following streets and number of 
homeowners on each. 
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Table 2 - STREETS IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, WHERE BLACKS 
OWNED HOMES: 1913 
Street Between Number of Hornes 
Highland 12th to 27th 104 
Woodland 12th to 14th 12 
Woodland 24th to 27th 27 
Flora 23rd to 25th 37 
Vine 12th to 15th 15 
Michigan 24th to 26th 35 
Cottage Flora & Woodland 18 
Howard Vine & Woodland 7 
These streets generally cut through portions of the Bowery, 
but blacks were also able to live in single family housing in 
Westport and the Dunbar Addition to the south. 
In addition to the Bowery, Hick's Hollow, and Belvidere, 
Kansas City, Missouri, had several other small black locations 
at the turn of the century. These_ are illustrated in Figure 2 
on the following page. The largest was in Westport where 
approximately 600 blacks lived just south of the present 
Westport Square location. Several hundred families also lived 
in the following locations: Roundtop subdivision on 28th and 
29.th. {just south of the present I-70); the Leads district at 
35th and Topping (near the Leeds Industrial District); the 
Dunbar suodivision between 53rd and 54th on Prospect, Montgall, 
Benton, and Agnes; the area around State Line and 31st Street 
extending into Rosedale, Kansas; Finally, several fanilies :mnain-
ed in the West Bottoms, near the Coates Hotel west of Broad-
way, and from 28th to 29th on Sununit. 4 
The Westport location has an interesting history. Two 
prominent Kansas Citians, Ward and Wornall {for whom main 
thoroughfares are named after) were opposed to slavery and 
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therefore operated an underground railway before the Civil 
War to help slaves escape. The property they owned included 
the land running from Westport Avenue southward to 46th 
Street, and from Pennsylvania Avenue westward to Summit Street. 
When the war was over they deeded some of this land to a group 
of former slaves. When blacks began occupying property in 
this section it was mostly isolated from Kansas City, still 
to the north. Later, however, when Kansas City began rapidly 
growing southward toward this location, many prominent white 
businessmen, feeling that the "Negro" district lowered sur-
rounding property values, frequently made offers to buy out 
all of the property occupied by blacks. In one instance, an 
offer was made to physically move their homes out of Westport 
to another location where blacks were living and, in addition, 
offered them two lots for their one (Comstock, 1936:1). 
These offers were always turned down. Blacks in Westport gave 
the impression of middle class prosperity compared to the main 
black section, the Bowery (Ibid.). Unfortunately, most of 
them were finally forced out when St. Luke's Hospital was con-
structed in the 1950s and several other industrial develop-
ment proposals were planned, none of which was ever built 
(Fields interview, 1978). Today, only a handful of their 
descendants remain living in their original homes. 
The Dunhar addition at 54th and Prospect is another ex-
ample of an isolated black area that caused concern to whites 
'\\Tho eventually moved into housing that · surrounded Dunbar. 
Dunbar was formed in 1905 beyond the city limits (KC Call, 
October 10, 1924). By the t2os, white expansion was pressing 
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at Dunbar's boundaries. In 1924, led by improvement associ-
ations, whites proposed to have the Park Board buy up ten 
blocks of homes occupied by blacks (Ibid.=)· The Park Board 
refused, reluctant to get involved in what they considered 
"property rights," not to mention their hesitency to purchase 
already occupied land and convert it into a park when there 
was already an abundance of vacant land available for that 
purpose (Ibid.). 
The same tactics were used in 1927 when the East Better-
ment League sought to have the Park Board relocate blacks 
living in th.e Roundtop subdivision, where blacks had lived 
since the 1890s (KC Call, October 16, 1927). Again, the Park 
Board refused. Four years earlier, the Greenwood Improvement 
Association had formed to isolate Roundtop by enclosing it 
with a "dead wall" ·tKC Call, October 19, 1923); in other words, 
establishing a zone around Roundtop that would allow whites 
to live separately from blacks. Other methods were also used, 
s·uch as allowing the building inspector the right to refuse 
building permits to blacks in white neighborhoods; this re-
sulted in a mandamus suit by blacks against the City (Ibid.). 
The Court failed to ever review it, however, which allowed 
enough time to pass for the Park Board to purchase the pro-
perty in question under the suit and turn it into a play-
ground {_Ibid. ) • 
There are also similar cases involving isolated single 
families. For instance, the Jackson family lived in a home 
at 20 south Cherokee Street in Rosedale, Kansas, for 38 years 
when whites in 1928 had moved in around them. Neighbors 
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stoned their house, built fences around the yard, dug trenches 
so water would drain into their yard, and broke into their 
house six times, once posing as officers demanding that the 
Jacksons leave: calls to the police went unanswered because 
the general feeling was that the Jacksons were wrongdoers, 
not the neighbors (.KC Call, July 20, 1928). 
By 1900, blacks were also living in several outlying areas 
away from the two largest concentrations in the two Kansas 
Cities. One of the most noteworthy was in Independence, 
where a fairly large black population had lived before the 
Civil War. In 1860, their total population was 3,164 with 
700 blacks: by 1970, the total had risen to nearly 120,000 
while the number of blacks had declined slightly (due to urban 
.renewal) to 621. Liherty, Olathe, and Merriam were also 
settled just prior to the 20th Century. Their black popu-
lations had all reached several hundred by 1930 and remained 
stable up to 1970. Table V shows the black population levels 
of these communities, along with several other smaller ones. 
Figure 3 on the next page shows their locations relative to 
Kansas City, Mi•ssouri, and Kansas, where_about 75 percent of 
the black populati.on lived in 1930; by 1950, it had grown to 
93 percent. 
TABLE 3 - BLACK POPULATION IN OUTLYING AREAS OF THE KCMR 
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 
Independence 864 846 749 779 713 m-
Liberty 421 496 432 407 387 404 
Olathe 269 235 315 395 479 
~rriam 102 187 166 159 155 
lee Sumnit 29 23 17 16 
Pleasant Hill 145 87 75 53 19 
Excelsior Spgs.308 274 280 278 256 470 
Parkville 75 120 144 
Westcm 53 8 7 
Bonner Spgs. 174 205 268 268 245 
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Up until around 1890, Quality Hill was the prestige lo-
cation for whites in Kansas City, Uissouri. Built in 1865, 
and presently being considered for a redevelopment project 
under the National Historical Preservation Act, it is roughly 
located west of Washington Street to the Bluffs overlooking 
the stockyards, and from 8th to 11th (see fig.4). The once 
magnificent one-family mansions were rapidly transformed in 
a 15 year period to apartments housing seven and eight families 
(Board of Public Welfare, KCMO., 1912:44). 
Another prestige location that attracted many Quality 
Hill residents was Santa Fe Place, which was bounded by 27th, 
30th, Prospect, and Indiana; still others moved to Hyde Park 
bounded by 36th, 39th, Gilliam Boulevard, and Harrison (see 
fig. 4). Santa Fe Place flourished in the 1 20s when most of 
the City's powerful lived there (KC Star, December 8, 1978). 
While the prosperity of Hyde Park continued through the •sos, 
and is today enjoying a back to the city renaissanoo, Santa 
Fe Place gradually began to decline by the 1 30s. Jewel Free-
man (Neal)_, a long-time resident who has written about the 
neighborhood gives two reasons for the decline (1956). First 
J.C. Nichols began to build the Country Club district south 
of 47th Street in 1925 and this attracted the City's wealthy 
families, many from Santa Fe Place. Second, with the "Great 
Crash" of 1929, many families began to allow their magnificent 
homes to deteriorate. Additionally, blacks were rarely able 
to penetrate the formidable Troost boundry protecting Hyde 
Park, but they were increasingly buying homes closer to Santa 
Fe Place ·whi.ch ha.d fewer "ni.ce" neighborhoods surrounding it. 
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FIGURE 4 - ~ALITY HILL, SANTA FE PIACE, 
AND HYDE PARK: 1925 
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Before the '30s, the possibility of blacks moving into Santa 
Fe Place was not considered due to the expensive and exclu-
sive character of the area. By 1931, however, most of the 
weal thy whites were leaving and only the middle class remained. 
Fearful of black intrusion, they decided to impose 30 year 
racial covenants on their property (Ibid.). The power of 
this act is illustrated by the fact that no black was able 
to live within Santa Fe Place until the Shelley decision in 
1948 overturned the covenants, even though blacks were living 
on nearly all sides of the neighborhood by the 1940s. In the 
1950s, Santa Fe Place became the home of many upper-class 
blacks and many of them remain there today. 
LIFE FOR BLACKS IN KANSAS CIT_Y BEFORE 1·900 
Despite the high level of racial hostility in and around 
Kansas City during these years, there is evidence to suggest 
that th.ere was a period when racial relations were relatively 
good in the City. . Moreover, segregation was, surprisingly, 
much more prounounced in the 20th Century than it was in the 
1870s. In 1875, for example, blacks lived in most of Kansas 
City's neighborhoods on an integrated basis (Brown and Dorsett, 
1978:47; and KC Call, July 27, 1928). The few middle-class 
blacks that lived in Kansas City were not restricted to slum 
housing, as even the upper class and professional blacks were 
in the years before 1950. In the slum of "East Kansas," des-
cribed earlier, blacks were more or less integrated by "the 
"'1;. 
1pressures of grinding misery," with Irish, Italians, and na-
tive whites; all were crowded together (Ibid.). The Kansas 
City Call wrote that many blacks and an equal number of whites 
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lived with no hint of segregation or prejudice in Belvidere 
and Hickts Hollow, "side by side in rough shacks." Residents 
here fought frequently, the Call says, but race did not play 
as important a part in the disputes as the tough environment 
of the neighborhood. In the West Bottoms, the same integrated 
conditions prevailed. By 1880, the Call states that there was 
still no definite plan for segregating the housing of blacks 
and whites; "folks were too busy trying to live to think of 
racial differences ..• Negroes lived in houses scattered all 
over the city" (Ibid.). Gunnar Myrdal argues, however, that 
"generally it is true both in the South and in the North that 
segregatiop as a factor in concentrating the Negro population 
is a pattern that is most characteristic of higher class areas 
and is much weaker or totally absent in slum areas U944:620). 
Perhaps the lack of segregation during this period is not 
as widespread as the Call maintains, even among the lower in-
come classes, but it nevertheless appears that no systematic 
effort was made to separate the races in Kansas City before 
around 1880.. At least until this time the black population 
was growing more out of choice than dictate (KC Call,. Novem-
ber 21, 1930}. One possible reason for the relatively peace-
ful racial atmosphere was the passage of the 13th, 14th, and 
15th Amendments, and a series of civil rights acts passed be-
tween 1870 and 1875. They gave blacks everywhere new found 
freedoms that they would not enjoy again until at least the 
mid 1960s. For instance, many restaurants , and most saloons, 
were open to blacks; theatres were segregated, but equally so; 
drug stores served blacks without protest; the Coates House, 
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Kansas City's most prestigious hotel, admitted blacks equally; 
black women, who could afford them, were fitted with dresses 
with the same courtesy as whites; the city's first park at 
18th and Holmes was opened to everyone, as was the City's 
second park, Spring Valley, at 18th and Troost. 5 Inter-
marriage was also common due to the relatively free contact 
between the races (Brown & Dorsett, 1978:46). 
These conditions were nevertheless short lived and a 
series of events seemed to influence a change toward increased 
separation. First, Brown and Dorsett maintain that the newly 
found freedoms of blacks were resented by many whites who 
found it difficult to accept blacks on an "equal" basis (Ibid.). 
Whites apparently felt that the civil rights legislation went 
too far and posed a threat to their long held belief in white 
superiority. The Call notes in Kansas City that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, which granted black access to _public aa:aro-
dations, was negatively received by nearly every business that 
served the white public, principally because their white cus-
tomers demanded not to be served along with blacks (November 
21, 1930). The Act persuaded the city's two most popular and 
prestigious hotels, the Coates House and the Phillips, to 
alter their policies: the Coates House began to exlude blacks 
entirely, while the Phillips, though continuing to accept 
blacks, said they would receive less than the best accommoda-
tions, with service at a high price (Brown & Dorsett, 1978:47). 
Thus the pattern was set. By the turn of the century, all of 
Kansas City's hotels that patronized whites excluded black 
clientele entirely. Even blacks making deliveries to hotels 
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were now told to use back doors an<l freight elevators so 
white patrons would not be offended (KC Call, September 25, 
1931). Theaters and restaurants followed suit and blacks 
were forced to open their own theaters and eat in their own 
restaurants. Department stores served blacks, but would not 
allow them to try on clothing (KC Call, Weptember 14, 1928 
and May 30, 1930). Miscegenation laws were now strictly 
enforced with stiff $500 fines; enforcement frequently re-
sulted in mistaken racial identity because many blacks with 
lighter skin were identified as whites (KC Call, January 
6 22, 1926). 
In essence, most businesses in Kansas City that served 
whites came to accept the belief that it was bad business to 
give blacks the same consideration as whites. Therefore, they 
were either excluded entirely or segregated and given the 
worst seats and service. Once one hotel, restaurant, drug 
store, etc., started to adopt such policies, everyone else 
was inclined to do likewise for the fear of losing customers 
(Swinton interview, 19781. As a result, segregation and 
discrimination in public accomodations continued in Kansas 
City until the City narrowly passed an ordinance prohibiting 
it in 1963. Miscegenation laws remained on the books in 
Missouri until they were repealed in 1968. 
A second factor which altered white attitudes toward 
blacks was the great "Negro exodus" of 1879 and 1880. Blacks 
by the thousands from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee 
were lured to Kansas by false promises of free land, mules, 
and government aid)Painter, 1976). The migration was brief 
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but its impact was significant. Within a few days, thousands 
of blacks had arrived by steamboat at Quindaro landing in Kan-
sas City, Kansas. White Kansas Citians who observed the boats 
coming up the Missouri river were alarmed, They feared that 
all the blacks in the south were coming to Kansas City, a much 
heard rumor from people downriver (Ibid.). Many of them did 
settle in the town of Wyandotte near what is now the west end 
of the inter-city viaduct in Kansas City, Kansas, just east of 
3rd and north of Everett Avenue. Their settlement, called 
"Juniper Village," later became a Kansas City, Kansas, ghetto. 
Although many others were able to move westward to "Tennessee 
Town," in Topeka, to Niccodemus and several other small Kansas 
towns, the growth of the black population in Kansas City, Kan-
sas, can easily be seen from the following data, 
Table 4 - TOTAL BLACK POPULATION IN KANSAS CITY, KANSAS: 1860-







The large influx of population was not, however, restricted 
to blacks. In 1860, 108,000 people lived in the entire state 
of Kansas. By 1890, despite the state's harsh climate, more 
than 1,400,000 people had come to the state. The migration of 
whites ended as quickly as it had for blacks, 
Kansas City, Missouri, was not unaffected by the large mi-
g~ation of blacks during this short period. The City's popula-
tion increased significantly from 1860 to 1890, as indicated in 
Table 5 on the next page. 
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Table 5 - BLACK POPULATION, KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI: 1860 - 1890. 
Total Black 
Population Population 
1860 4,418 190 
1870 32,260 3,764 
1880 55,785 8,146 
1890 132,716 13,700 
(City Development Department, KCMO., 1969:7) 
The Kansas City Star also gives an indication of the chang-
ing attitudes toward blacks in Kansas City. When it was found-
ed in 1880, the young and liberal paper was praised by blacks 
as the " ••• only paper that has recognized our claim of impartial 
justice, equality before the law or sympathy attendant upon our 
common humanity" (KC Star, October 29, 1970:15). At the time, 
editorials were written about the terrible hardships faced by 
blacks and sympathized with their plight. By 1885, however, 
their mood had changed to one of protecting white interests and 
criticizing blacks for demanding too much freedom (Ibid.). 
Despite the large number of incoming blacks coming to Kansas 
in 1879, the southern migration to most northern cities follow-
ing the emancipation was slow. This was especially true in 
Kansas City. In 1860, 90 percent of the blacks in the country-
lived in the south7 40 years later, 90 percent still lived there 
(Taueber, 1965:11). Several events rapidly altered this situa-
tion: first, the boll weevil devastated the South's cotton crop 
limiting social and economic opportunities~ second, the North, 
expanding its industrial production in response to the war 
effort, opened up thousands of jobs; third, restrictions on Euro-
pean migration following WWI opened up still further job· oppor-
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tunities to blacks (Ibid.}. -
An important fourth factor was the increasing racial vio-
lence in the South, mostly from resentful poor whites who had 
always felt that blacks, even as slaves, were better off than 
they were. During the last quarter of the 19th Century, 3,284 
blacks were lynched, almost exclusively in the South (Barne, 
1909:174). According to the Tuskegee Institute, 1,217 lynch-
ings occurred between 1890 and 1900; from 1900 to 1908, there 
were another 857 (Aptheker, 1951:792). From 1900 to 1930, 
when the nwnber nationwide was declining significantly, there 
were 41 lynchings in Missouri, including two each in Platte and 
Clay Counties; during the same period, Kansas had nine (KC Star, 
September 29, 1970:15). Rarely were those responsible success-
fully prosecuted. The last lynching in Missouri occurred in 
Sikeston in 1942 {~.). 
While the violence in the South was ignited by severe eco-
nomic probems, in the North, the more the black population 
swelled, the more whites perceived them as a threat. Kluger 
notes that during the first 15 years of the 20th Century there 
was an outpouring of racism and violence in many northern cities 
that had never before flourished (1976:84-88). Everywhere, 
there was a breakdown of restraint. Institutions gave their 
tacit approval to racism: the Supreme Court, the media, in edu-
cation, in public life, in everything (Ibid.). 
The outpouring of white hatred in response to the northern 
migration was met by the country's first bloody riots in the 
"red-summeru. of 1919. Several northern cities, including Chi-
cago, Philadelphia, Detroit, and St. Louis, experienced riots. 
In St. Louis, thousands of blacks were routed from their homes, 
clubbed, stabbed, and even hung, in rioting that was triggered 
due to the hiring of blacks by a factory with government con-
tracts. One report listed 40 dead, while the NAACP tallyed 200 
(Ibid., 110). 
Although no riots of this magnitude occurred in Kansas City, 
news of them undoubtedly left a lasting impression on blacks 
and whites alike. The City was able to escape much of the vio-
lence, perhaps because they did not experience as great a rush 
of incoming blacks as did the other northern cities like Detroit 
and Chicago. With the exception of the few months in 1879, their 
growth was later in coming, slower, and steadier in comparison. 
Nor did defense industries hire black workers in Kansas City 
until WWII turban League, 1940). Furthermore, blacks in Kansas 
City did not appear to resist white racism so strongly as did 
other cities. Indeed, the black history of the City appears 
devoid of the militancy found elsewhere. Instead, black 
leaders stressed accornodation or "getting along." In the face 
of growing segregation and discrimination, they fought only for 
the "separate but equal" doctrine. Only when it was clear that 
the doctrine really meant "separate but unequal" would Kansas 
City's blacks demand greater access to white institutions. Simi-
larly, only when whites became aware that laws requiring sepa-
rate but equal facilities were economically unfeasible did they 
begin to reluctantly change the law. 
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HOUSING CONDITIONS IN_KANSAS CITY: 1920 - 1950 
In cities throughout the country, the primary economic 
effect of racial agreements was to limit the amomit of housing 
in which blacks were able to live (Weaver, 1948:234). Racial 
agreements in Kansas City produced an extreme shortage of avail-
able housing for blacks prior to 1950. For eJcample, from 
1925 to 1940, less than 15 new homes were built for blacks in 
Kansas City, Missouri (Webster, 1948:47). Only 200 new homes 
were built for black occupancy from 1940 to 1950 (KC Star, 
Webster, October 14, 1952:18). During the same period, while 
the black population had increased by 34 percent, there was only 
an increase of 22 percent in the number of dwelling units they 
occupied (Ibid.). 
The widespread usage and common knowledge of the existence 
, 
of racial agreements are principal reasons why blacks were con-
fined to the older, deteriorated housing in small, designated 
sections of the city. Whites were determined to keep blacks 
from moving outside of the black district. ·.Racial .covenants 
helped accomplish this as they provided an explicit and legal 
approval of housing segregation. Thomas Webster, the former 
executive director of the Urban League in Kansas City for nearly 
25 years, and long considered one of the city's most knowledge-
able sources of housing information during the years when racial 
covenants were widely used, wrote to a city councilman in 1946 
that "there is little area for expansion of the increased Negro 
population because of the use of racial restrictive covenants" 
(1949:146). 
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An editorial in the Kansas City Call describes the situation 
this way: "Kansas City ••. expects Negro citizens to remain fix-
ed while all others move ••• Negroes must have somewhere to live 
••• Neither its humanity nor its common sense makes Kansas City 
see that it must concede us homes somewhere" (August 16, 1927). 
Without access to new housing, or even existing housing, blacks 
were limited to neighborhoods where the black population already 
lived, or to the old deteriorated housing stock left behind by 
whites moving up the housing ladder to more desirable suburban 
locations. 
In 1940, 85 percent of the housing inhabited by blacks was: 
also considered in need of "redevelopment and rehabilitation" 
{Webster, 1948:23). By 1946, one study showed that 48 percent 
of Kansas City, Missouri's housing stock was in need of rehab-
ilitation; 10 percent of it was occupied by blacks, yet they also 
totaled 10 percent of the population (City Development Depart-
ment, KCMO., 1969:21). 
Further compounding the problem was the lack of vacant land 
on which to build additional housing within black areas '(KC --
~, 1938). Existing units were simply converted or divided 
for additional a_ oddtians (City Development Department, KCMO., 
19~9:28). Also contributing to the crowding and poor housing 
conditions was the long established practice by white landlords 
of razing their buildings to avoid paying taxes and building 
no new dwellings to replace the old ones (KC Call, August 1, 
1924). Fires in crowded worn out buildings inhabited by blacks 
were common place and disease rampant. For example, in 1923, 
53 people died as a direct result of diseases stemming from 
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crowded conditions (KC Call, September 19, 1923). As a token 
gesture to help alleviate the crowding, the city built a small 
number of barracks like boxes for black housing, with few accomrno-
odations. 
In 1940, 85 percent of the black occupied units were also 
rental housing, most of which was owned by white landlords 
(U.S. Census:880-883). The pattern of rental housing as the 
principal type of occupancy for blacks still persists today. 
Blacks often got caught between slum lords who were anxious 
to rent to blacks, and whites who did not want them as neighbors. 
The Kansas City Call, for instance, reported in 1925 that while 
a large group of whites were demonstrating to have blacks re-
moved from some apartments at 7th and Woodland, the owner of 
·the apartments said he would continue renting to blacks because 
the property was rundown and he did not want to repair any of 
the units; he claimed the apartments were "fit for the occupancy 
only of Negroes" (August 14, 1925). He was well aware that 
whites would never live there, and because there were no build-
ing or housing codes to force him to make repairs, he was anxious 
to rent to blacks. Many blacks, who were attracted to his apart-
ments by promises of free rent for the first month of occupancy, 
later moved out when handbills were circulated stating: •Notice 
to landlord, agent, and occupants. Colored tenants will not 
be tolerated in Garland Place" (Ibid.). 
An editorial in the Kansas City Call in 1931 lucidly des-
cribes the pitiful state of black housing in Kansas City: 
In a praninent block on 18th street, one of the sections 
of Kansas City where Negroes constitute the population, 
a recent development in business caused the removal of 
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some shacks which had stood for years. Next to them was 
one, as bad if not worse than those removed. At the com-
pletion of the improvement, this aged structure, stagger-
ing back from the street, and blackened with the smoke 
of many fires that had ravaged it, was given a covering 
of secondhand tin. It is now ready to carry on a few 
generations more. 
This bit of life tells the story of Negro housing. 
Our early years in Kansas City were spent in shacks. 
Until the inner urge got to the point where we faced 
opposition, even midnight banbs, we lived in shacks. To 
this day we are still in shacks wherever landlords are 
mercenary enough to offer old ruins for rent. Shacks 
are a crime against health which the city permits--an 
inexcusable failure to apply good common sense. What's 
the use of spending the public money to repair human 
damages through hospitals, charity funds and prisons, 
when the evil can be cut off at the source by putting into 
effect a building code that makes the landlord provide 
a decent house before he can invite its use. 
Because crowding was so severe and the supply of available hous-
ing so limited, blacks were also forced to pay inflated prices 
for inferior housing. In Kansas City, blacks commonly paid 
twice the amount for housing as whites who had earlier occupied 
the same units (KC Call, May 17, 1940). Even the Kansas City 
Real Estate Board reported in 1941 that "many owners were tak-
ing advantage of Negroes in the acute housing situation by 
raising the rents to a point which forced Negroes to buy homes 
at exorbitant prices (Webster, 1948:48). 
Moreover, even though real estate records show that a sub-
stantial amount of housing was built during the 1920s in Kan-
sas City, Missouri, between five and ten thousand homes stood 
vacant in the booming southern and eastern sections of the city; 
none of these homes were open to blacks due to racial covenants 
(KC Call, July 16, 1926). It is worth noting that many of the 
same whites who felt threatened by black residential expansion 
into their neighborhoods seriously argued that they had no where 
else to live {Ibid.), 
"DEADLINES" 
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A deadline was an informal name given to any artificial 
or natural barrier that whites and blacks came to recognise 
as a boundary over which blacks were not supposed to penetrate 
in their search for housing. In many cities they became major 
thoroughfares, commercially developed areas, railroad yards, 
parks, rivers, and so forth. They were not legally sanctioned 
by city mandate, but were rather de facto boundaries. For 
example, freeways frequently just so happen to be located in 
such a way that black residential movement is effectively stop-
ped. In Kansas City, deadlines were usually established through 
the promotional efforts of several home improvement associations 
·who designated specific streets as buffers from black infiltra-
tion. The location of these deadlines became well known by 
both blacks and whites and were often formidable barriers to 
black movement. It was common knowledge within the black com-
munit~y that crossing a deadline to obtain housing, or even to 
socialize, would violate the unwritten but well established 
social code prohibiting it. 
One of the first prominent deadlines was formed along 
Brooklyn Avenue in the direction of the eastward black move-
ment in the 1920s. Whites were well-established along the 
eastern side of Brooklyn; a few elite blacks did, however, 
manage to live east of Brooklyn (Fields interview, 1978). 
-... 
~ovement was also heavy to the south along Vine, Highland, and 
Woodland Avenues pressing at deadlines along 18th and 21st 
Streets. Racial tension erupted regularly in the deadline areas 
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and midnight bombings occurred frequently. Once Brooklyn was 
crossed, housing confrontations began to develop in the area 
between Brooklyn and Benton, ten blocks to the east, princip-
ally along Park, Olive, Wabash, Prospect, and Montgall streets. 
To the south, across 18th street, deadlines were set at various 
points up to 25th Street and to ti.ie east of Brooklyn lKC'":Call, 
June 11, 1926). It was in this general area during the late 
1920s that blacks faced the greatest amount of violent resis-
tance to their search for housing. White residents here took 
two deliberate steps to stop blacks, -First, two neighborhood 
groups formed for the express purpose of stopping black resi-
dential movement; the East Side Improvement Association and 
the Southeast Improvement Association (Ibid.), Second, they 
circulated handbills which said: "Warning. We must restrict 
our homes against Negroes" (KC Call, December 24, 1926). 
The deadlines were effective to a point, but they inevi-
tably broke down as the growing black population pressed at 
their boundaries, at first slowly, and then quickly spilling 
over. The pressure at racial boundaries was simply too great 
to constitute a permanent barrier. Myrdal suggests that "in 
spite of the white vigilance on the frontiers of Negro dis-
tricts, the one never gets absolutely fixed in all directions. 
Now and then a small break occurs, and the Negro community gains 
a little more space (1944:624). Robert Weaver likens the break-
down to a dam bursting Wider too much pressure: 
once a break is made, it is impossible to hold back the 
tide. What happens is that a new barrier is established 
somewhere beyond the location of the old one. This new 
barriet.,- in turn, holds until the pressure gets too great, 
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or until the barrier develops an internal weakness; 
in the housing situation, the internal weakness is 
usually in the form of chronic vacancies in a white 
area which permits seepage of Negroes. But in housing, 
because the area available is seldom adequate and the 
incomes of most of the newcomers are low, overcrowd-
ing typifies the newly added ~rea, as it did the older 
Black Belt (1948:239} 
The industrial areas along the Blue Valley, which separates 
Kansas City from Independence, acted as a natural barrier to black 
movement to the east, and this funneled even more blacks toward 
the south. After crossing 21st Street (and 25th and 28th in some 
locations}, it was not until the 1940s that the next deadline, 
27th Street, was crossed (Fields Interview, 1978}. Black 
movement was remarkably slow given the continued growth in pop-
ulation living in these areas. From 27th Street, the deadline 
moved to 31st, and then to 39th Street, 47th Street, and finally, 
in the late 1960s, to 63rd Street (Ibid.}. Perhaps no boundary 
in Kansas City, Missouri, however, proved more formidii})le than 
the north-south thoroughfare, Troost. Even today there are few 
blacks living west of Troost. 
Many whites living close to black neighborhoods that were 
threatening to push over into their own were often eager to 
sell to blacks; they wanted out and knew there were no white 
buyers. Despite the advantages whites saw in selling to blacks 
they were restrained from doing so (Myrdal, 1944:630). The 
principle reason was that they were afraid of breaking the law 
(restrictive covenants}, just as for the same reason blacks were 
afraid to buy (Voss, 1959~12}. In addition, neighbors and well 
organized improvement associations exerted tremendous social 
pressure on them not to sell to blacks. This pressure usually 
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worked until a black family broke the neighborhood ban~ then 
there was only the threat of a law suit to dissuade the rest 
(Myrdal, 1944:635), 
RACIAL VIOLENCE IN TRANSITIONAL NEIGHBORHOODS 
Frequent bombings, threats of violence, and intimidation 
began to erupt throughout neighborhoods bordering black and 
white sections. Signs were frequently posted warning blacks 
against buying in white areas and to realtors for selling to 
them, Below is a poster that was nailed to trees within a 
highly volatile neighborhood near 25th and Park in 1928 (KC 
Call, October 26). 
DANGER! 
COLORED PEOPLE are hereby notified that they will not be 
allowed to live in this block. 
THIS BLOCK IS WHITE AND IS GOING TO STAY WHITE AT ANY COST. 
Contemptible and unscrupulous white Real Estate Agents 
are trying to ruin the homes of hundreds of honest, law-
abiding white people, who have spent their life's sav-
ing to secure a comfortable home in a respectable neigh-
borhood. For a few dollars in money these "Parasites" 
will put the Negroes into trouble, 
A Committee of More Than One Thousand women and men have 
authorized this notice and are determined at any cost to 
keep the Negroes out of this block, 
If you are here, DON'T STAY, and if you are out, STAY OUT. 
By doing this you will save a lot of trouble to yourself 
and the white people, too (emphasis not added). 
Threatening letters similar to the following were also common-
place: 
You can move them up here, but I.' 11 blow up the first 
nigger that·tries to come in a house up here (KC call, 1927). 
Niggers have no business in this neighborhood. They 
ought to live in the hole north of Independence Avenue ••• 
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if they move into any houses in this neighborhood they 
will be made into sausage meat (KC Call, 1927). 
Such remarks were not usually carried out, and perhaps 
they are not truly representative of white attitudes toward 
blacks during this period. Certainly they were more common 
in neighborhoods confronted with the threat of black movement. 
Moveover, bombings were frequent enough to convince most blacks 
that the threats were not idle ones. Asa Martin reports one 
of the first violent episodes on record. In 1910 six homes 
along Montgall were bombed. Threats to others were made and 
30 days notice to leave was given, followed by the signature 
"Dynamite" (1913:34). The remaining blacks who were not bomb-
ed were unable to sell their homes so they could leave, even 
though they lowered their asking price significantly (Ibid.). 
The survey of the KC Call revealed that bombings and 
racial violence reached a peak in Kansas City during the 1920s, 
continued through the early 1930s when it subsided, only to 
be revived for a few brief months in the early 1950s. The 
survey also indicated 18 separate bombings of black homes from 
1924 to 1930. Undoubtedly there were several additional bomb-
ings that were either not reported or were missed in the survey. 
Perhaps more persuasive than bombings in Kansas City were 
the vivid accounts in the Call of bombings in other cities 
throughout the country. Since the Call reached nearly every 
black home in Kansas City, the impact must have been substan.:...· 
tial. Consequently, the fear of violence inhibited blacks 
from considering a move into a white neighborhood. Even those 
who risked moving and were fortunate anough to avoid an act of 
reprisal lived in constant fear that it could also happen to 
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them due to the continual harrassment and threats by neighbors 
who objected to their presence. The Call's pages are fill-
ed with examples of black residents who routinely received 
calls in the night, threatening letters, rocks through windows, 
personal abuse, vandalism, and all forms of humiliation. These 
incidents were constant reminders to blacks that they were 
not welcome in white neighborhoods, and that violators would 
be dealt with harshly, if necessary. 
Naturally, many black families were persuaded to leave. 
If the ill treatment did not force them out, there was always 
the threat of a law suit to enforce racial covenants. Not 
surprisingly, every law suit in Kansas City demanding the en-
forcement of racial covenants occurred in a transitional 
-neighborhood. Blacks rarely challenged the covenants because 
the cost of going to court was too great and the chances of 
winning slim. NAACP funds were often used for racial 
covenant cases, but they were stretched too thin nationally 
for Kansas City to receive their financial support (KC Call, 
November 30, 1947). Given these bleak prospects, most blacks 
were therefore persuaded not to even try and challenge the 
"system" by attempting to move; they stayed,for the most part, 
within the designated boundaries, moving into neighborhoods 
no longer wanted by whites. 
Although the official city policy did not condone violence 
as a means of halting black movement into white areas, there 
are few honest attenpts.on record to halt such behavior (KC 
Call Survey). When otherwise law abiding citizens held meetings 
in church basements and openly discussed the w.rious, ways they 
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could intimidate blacks who tried to move (Bluford and Benton 
interviews, 1978), the police did nothing to intercede when 
supplied with reliable information that bombings would occur 
(KC Call Survey). Police response to requests for help never 
came until after a home was already bombed or vandalized, and 
even then no concrete action was ever undertaken (Ibid.). 
If the white citizenry did not always agree with the usage 
of such ugly, often violent tactics, their sympathy was, never-
theless, not with black victims. Whites considered black intru-
ders as lawbreakers. Not only did they think their need to 
exclude blacks was morally right, the existence of racial cove-
nants made them believe their efforts to keep blacks out was 
legally right, as well. 
HOME IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATIONS 
Racial covenants were sometimes written by individual home 
owners. Generally, however, they were promoted by two groups: 
neighborhood improvement associations and developers of sub-
divisions. Both of them had support from realtors, the Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA), and financial institutions, whose 
policies advocated racial segregation. No one element in 
Kansas City was more responsible for promoting the need for 
racial covenants, and stirring up racial animosity, than the 
home improvement or "betterment" associations (Ibid.). 
Numerous such groups were organized after WWI in response to 
the threat of black movement. For many of them, especially in 
··,1 transitional areas where the threat of black encroachment was •., 
the strongest, their sole purpose was to prevent blacks from 
entering white neighborhoods. The same trend was occurring 
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all over the country, particularly in northern cities where 
blacks were rapidly migrating from the South. By the late 
1940s, homes associations were routinely included by develop-
ers as a requirement of the title deed, but the activities of 
the suburban organizations were far different from the earlier 
ones that were specifically created to stop black movement. 
To accomplish their goal of promoting racial segregation, 
the homes associations abutting black areas were principally 
involved in canvassing neighborhoods to secure greater coverage 
of racial covenants, lobbying City Hall, and most importantly, 
attracting broad public support for racial segregation. The 
amount of money spent on these activities was not insignificant. 
A large portion of their funding went to salary and legal fees 
_used in connection with racial covenants (Weaver, 1948:250). 
For example, an estimated 150 protective associations were 
operating in Detroit and they supplied most of the financial 
and legal support for interests wishing to see the racial cove-
nants maintained (Voss, 1959:146-148). 
THE LINWOOD IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the most influential of all 
neighborhood groups in Kansas City was the notorious Linwood 
Improvement Association (LIA). Created in 1915, it was one of 
the first in the city. As with other such organizations prior 
to 1950, the Associations' main purpose was to keep blacks out 
of white neighborhoods. A typical example was a controversy in 
the late 1920s over the land contained within the boundaries of 
28th to 31st,. from Brooklyn to Paseo. The LIA actively cam-
paigned at City Hall by asking the City Council to "aid in the 
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fight against colored residents moving into white neighborhoods" 
KC Call, May 28, 1926). The LIA was concerned because the 2800 
blocks on woodland and Michigan had recently been taken over by 
blacks and it was rumored that the 2900 block of Woodland would 
soon be turned over by whites who were anxious to sell. Emotions 
ran high. The LIA proposed to have the City condemn enough land 
between 28th and 29th streets, and between Spring Valley and 
Troost parks, to serve as a deadline to black movement. Sixty-
two homes that were owned by blacks were located within this 
area. The LIA proceeded to launch a petition drive and obtain-
ed over 4,000 names supporting the condemnation. They urged 
homeowners to restrict their homes against "race." The presi-
dent of the LIA, John Bowman, a realtor by trade, claimed that 
66 to 80 percent of the homes in the area contained restrictions 
on race (KC Call, June 4, 1928). He added that the LIA repre-
sented some 10,000 "good" white people. 
Blacks respon.ded to the LIA campaign by forming their own 
neighborhood group, the Spring Valley Improvement Association 
(KC Call, September 10, 1926), perhaps the first such group 
for blacks in Kansas City. They attempted to gather data on 
population and housing conditions that would reveal the LIA's 
plan to unload the cost of the project on unknowing white resi-
dents south of 29th street (KC Call, August 17, 1926). Whites 
did, in fact, balk at the deadline proposal upon hearing that 
estimates for the cost of condemnation were placed at between 
one and two million dollars (Ibid.). Consequently, the LIA 
campaign failed to achieve the amount of coverage they had 
hoped for. Many whites may have been hesitent to sign a re-
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strictive agreement for fear that it might lock them in. 
Whites were caught in a dilemma: they wanted protection from 
black movement, yet they also wanted the freedom to move away 
if blacks entered their neighborhood, but racial covenants 
brought the possibility of lawsuit if sales were made to blacks. 
In the end, the City turned down the LIA's proposal saying they 
could not justify another park area (KC Call, June 18, 1926). 
In 1927, the LIA held a meeting for all neighborhood groups 
in Kansas City to make plans for a National Protective Associ-
ation whose purpose was "to protect property from encroachments" 
(KC Call, July 29, 1927). They urged restrictions "to keep 
Negroes where they are," asserting that property values would 
go down if action was not taken. A band concert heightened the 
festival atmosphere of the meeting. Application was made to the 
circuit court for a 20 year proforma decree of incorporation 
for the Association. The ultimate hope was to conduct a national 
movement to regulate the race question as it related to residen-
tial restrictions (KC Call, August 13, 1926). 
Neighborhood groups such as the LIA were frequently unsuc-
cessful in accomplishing their goal of barring blacks from white 
neighborhoods. Yet their effectiveness can be measured by the 
long term influence they had on racial attitudes. Their well 
publicized campaigns to promote the need for racial covenants 
made the public acutely aware of their existence. In turn, they 
helped promote and perpetuate racial animosity and prejudice 
The deep racia.L.hatred run:bored by hc:x&ES associatioo.s durinq the height 
of racial covenant activity is perhaps best reflected in the 
statement of an officer of the Brookland-Dahlgreen Terrace 
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Protective Association in Washin_gton, D.C., who told members: 
You're having a scourge here. You see colored real 
estate agents scurrying up your streets. It's too bad 
you can't take a nice healthy club or crowbar and lay 
them in the gutter where they belong. But our only 
redress is the courts and [racial covenants] (Weaver, 
1948: 250) • 
DEVELOPERS AND SUBDIVIDERS 
Although protective associations were the most vocal pro-
moters of racial covenants, their effectiveness in blanketing 
neighborhoods with them was insignificant compared with the 
success of developers. Developers wrote restrictions into the 
original title deed to each lot before the potential occupants 
had even purchased their homes; there was no involvement of the 
eventual parties to the agreement. While covenants written in 
transitional areas, on the other hand, caused more publicity 
and produced all of the court battles, agreements written by 
subdividers were handled quietly, yet their effect was immense-
ly greater. Acting at first on their own initiative, and later 
under pressure from sources of finance (FHA), developers could 
totally restrict a new subdivision. McEntire describes them 
as follows: 
the modern large-scale merchant builder [who] builds 
not just houses but entire camnunities ••• the combination 
of large-scale building methods with racial discrimination 
has given rise to the phe·nomenon of the totally white 
community ••• the developer has the power to exclude, and 
generally uses it to exclude unwanted minority groups 
completely (1960:177). 
As a result, the rapid growth of suburban communities espe-
cially since 1-MII from which non-whites were absolutely ex-
cluded by the actions of developers, has undoubtedly extended 
and intensified racial segregation. 
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Developers were encouraged by many organizations to adopt 
the practice of including racial restrictions in title deeds. 
One such organization was the American Society of Civil Engin-
eers. In their 1939 Manual of Land Division, they discussed 
the question of property declining due to the intrusion of 
blacks. The Manual states that 
R·estrictive covenants in deeds specifying the exact use 
of property, the side, rear, and front yards, the cost 
of the house, the architecture, and even the race of 
the inhabitants, are extremely useful in design. They 
should be outlined at the time the design is made. 
The judicious use of racial covenants will do much to 
establish and protect property values. Such covenants 
are valuable in all residential development; subdivi-
sions for the poor, as well as those of more ample means, 
benefit from these controls. 
One developer in Kansas City ·, J. c. N.ichols, f irrnly shared these 
views and provided the impetus -for excluding -~uburban occupancy 
and, ·.as a result, ·changed the entire pattern of black novenent. 
J.C. NICHOLS 
Restrictions on property first began to appear in the 
United States just prior to WWI. J.C. Nichols, the most impor-
tant name in housing and land development in Kansas City, was 
one of the first developers in the country to promote restric-
tions. He believed that restrictions were necessary to maintain 
the quality of housing he °intended to build. Not only did he 
want to protect his investments, he wanted to guarantee home 
buyers that certain "undesirable" elements would "forever" be 
excluded. Theodore Brown, in his history of Kansas City, says 
that intentions were "to so maintain ••• property that it 
will permanently remain Kansas City's best residential district 
••• assuring buyers of home sites ••• that high standards will for-
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ever be jealously guarded and protected against all undesirable 
conditions or any civic neglect" (1963:174). 
Nichols:' restrictions were written on "exclusiveu high 
priced properties. In fact, among the first racial restrictions 
in Kansas City were those written by Nichols for Mission Hills 
in 1914 (Johnson County Plat Books). As anyone familiar with 
Kansas City knows, Mission Hills remains the most prestigious 
and affluent community in the KCMR. The presence of racial 
restrictions had a strong appeal to many of Kansas City's well 
to do who were moving from formerly exclusive areas, such as 
Quality Hill and Santa Fe Place, and who had experienced the 
effect of declining neighborhoods. Consequently, Nicholst 
reputation grew and as black movement increasingly threatened 
white neighborhoods, so did the acceptance of his philosophy 
of restrictions. By the 1920s, the practice,once confined to upper-
class neighborhoods, had filtered ·down to properties 
inhabited by the middle class;. shortly ·thereafter, even the lower 
class neighborhoods used them. 
At first Nichols kept his restrictions simple: minimum lot 
size, minimum house size, minimum cost of lot and house, and 
other prohibitions which added to the "exclusive" character of 
the development. Most importantly, Nichols wanted to exclude 
non-caucasians. Because some of his first property was already 
deteriorating, in the 1930s he extended the term of the restric-
tions from the normal 10 years to 25 years. He also continued 
·•i;o develop and refine his concept and added several new restric-
tions for ·billboards, architectural design, color, and procedures 
for making renovations (Brown, 1963:175). In addition, restric-
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tions that had previously been renewed only upon a majority vote 
of the residents were changed to an automatic renewal, unless 
the majority voted otherwise (Ibid.). Lastly, to insure that 
the restrictions were carefully enforced, he required that each 
subdivision appoint a homes association. 
Nichols used the restrictions as a powerful selling tool 
and others were soon emulating his ideas. One important example 
is that lenders, who also saw restrictions as a good way of pro-
tecting their investments, soon began to demand them as a rou-
tine part of a developer's loan application. The relationship 
between developers and lenders therefore had a significant ex-
clusionary effect. In every sense, Nichols set the standard 
for the housing industry in Kansas City. In doing so, he played 
a major role in establishing segregation for generations. 
PLANNING CONTROLS 
During the period shortly after WWI, planners also began to 
use restrictive covenants as a land-use planning tool by per-
suading developers to include them in deeds to property con-
tained in subdivisions (Hagman, 1975:306). This became a prac-
tice of major importance because it helped institutionalize racial 
covenants within the housing industry. Similarly, once master 
plans were being written for cities, planners routinely set out 
sections suitable for black location. The first master plans in the 
Kansas City area were written in Kansas City, Kansas, by Harlan 
Barthalemew in 1927. A large detailed map recommends the blocks 
irt which blacks should be allowed to live? The plan itself advo-
cates that the races be kept separate. Subsequent plans 
with the same recommendations were written in 1932 and 1947. 
Kansas City, Missouri's first master plan was in 1943, and while 
there is nothing as explicitly racial as the Kansas City, Kansas, 
plans, it advocates the continued separation of the races for 
social and economic reasons (City Planning Department). 
Early planners expressed the belief that homogeneity, both 
racial and economic, was desirable. Planning controls, such as 
zoning, were intended to achieve that purpose. One writer who 
observed these developments in 1920 wasprarpted to say that 
city planners and zoning experts were appealing to their 
clientele with promises that the new controls would pro-
tect them from 'undesirable neighbors' ••• to keep out 
Negroes, Japanese, Armenians, or whatever race most jars 
on the .natives (Toll, 1969:262). 
Planners who held these beliefs were significantly aided 
in the 1926 decision, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, (272 U.S. 
365). While the Supreme Court sought to hold state power in 
check nine years earlier in Buchanan, in Euclid the Court upheld 
the concept of a comprehensive municipal zoning ordinance, unless 
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. Euclid allowed planners to 
zone by social and economic class,thus perpetuating segregation. 
As a stated purpose, zoning by race, however, was largely possible 
because racial discrimination was socially acceptable; the legal 
process and the actions of planners merely aided and confirmed 
these beliefs. 
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Chapter 3 - Legal Issues 
Property Rights vs. States Rights 
Despite the passage of the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, 
along with several civil rights laws shortly after the Civil 
War, whites maintained an overwhelming superior legal status 
to blacks. In 1883, the Supreme Court invalidated several 
sections of the 1875 Civil Rights Act by stating that the 14th 
Amendment does not prohibit the "wrongful acts of individuals 
unsupported by state authority ••• laws, customs, or judicial or 
executive proceedings" (Kluger, 1976). In 1896, Plessy v. 
Ferguson decided that segregation was compatible with equality 
(163 u.s~ 537). As a result of these and other cases, it was 
clear that regardless of the issue, the chances of blacks win-
ning through the judicial process during the first half of the 
20th Century were remote (Kluger, 1976). 
Although racial covenants are a relatively new phenomenon, 
their foundation can be traced to English common law. Under 
the statute of Westminster I~I enacted in 1290, a free indivi-
dual had unrestrained "freedom to sell at his own pleasure his 
lands and tenements" (Voss, 1959:2). At this time, regulations 
and restrictions on the use of property were considered wrong, 
unless of significant social importance (Ibid.,12). From these 
principals, property rights of individuals evolved as "absolute" 
rights unless contrary to the interests of the state--an issue 
that would receive much debate in the 20th Century. 
The first known case regarding the validity of racial re-
strictions was an 1890 municipal ordinance directed against the 
Chinese in San Francisco. Because it was a "public" action, 
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the u.s. Circuit Court for the Southern District of California 
ruled that the restriction denied the Chinese equal protection 
of the laws (Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (1892)). 
Municipal legislation was also passed in Baltimore in 1910 
making it a violation of the City's zoning ordinance to permit 
a black person the right to purchase a home from a white. (Weav-
er, 1948:235). Atlanta, Richmond, Louisville, and cities in 
several other southern and border states soon followed suit. 
In the north, some suburban cities were also beginning to pass 
ordinances excluding blacks from the city limits between 8:00 
P.M. and 6:00 A,M. (Hagman, 1975:306). By 1917, the Supreme 
Court invalidated the Louisville ordinance claiming that it 
was an unreasonable interference with the right of property 
owners to freely dispose of their property without due process 
of the law (Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60). In Buchanan, the 
Court was concerned only with "state interference with property 
rights" and did not extend the principle to include private 
agreements to exclude blacks. In effect, the court refused to 
look at the issue as one of race (a common tendency of the 
courts until after WWII). Indeed, the Court felt that segre-
gation was the best solution to the problem of avoiding racial 
hostility (Ibid._). 
The first impression of the Buchanan decision is that it 
was an important victory for blacks because it effectively pre-
vented further segregation by public institutions. It is clear 
now, however, that the racial covenant was a much more effec-
tive method of achieving segregation than was the local ordi-
dance, Before Buchanan, segregation laws were subject to the 
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political process and therefore the possibility of repeali cov-
enants, however, could restrict land forever against blacks. In 
effect, there was no practical way of removing a covenant from 
the books. Furthermore, had residential segregation by ordi-
nance been upheld in Buchanan, the Supreme court would have most 
likely required equal, though separate, facilities (Weaver, 1948: 
232). Under the control of private racial covenants, black 
housing remained separate and there was no public responsibil-
ity to insure that urban land be set aside or made available 
for black ownership or occupancy. Instead, black housing was 
confined to a limited area. In short, perhaps the most signifi-
cant result of Buchanan was that it increased the importance 
of the racial covenant as the primary legal procedure available 
for the exclusion and segregation of black housing. 
CORRIGAN VS. BUCKLEY 
The inviolability of property rights as they were applied 
to the restrictive covenant cases, along with the desire of 
whites to segregate blacks, presented the courts with a serious 
conflict over the state's power to control property rights and 
the individual's right to due process and equal protection under 
the 14th Amendment. In the first racial covenant case to reach 
the courts, the Louisiana Supreme court, in upholding the cove-
nant, emphasized the importance of property and public policy • 
••• it would be unfortunate if our system of land tenure 
were so hidebound, or if the public policy of the general 
government ••• or state was so narrow, as to render un-
practicable a scheme such as the one in question in this 
case, whereby an owner has sought to dispose of his pro-
perty advantageously to himself and beneficially to the 
city wherein it lies (Queensborough Land Company v. Caz-
eaux, 67 So. 641 (1915)). -
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The attitude of the courts, in general, was cogently described 
in Parmalee v. Morris, where the Michigan Supreme Court ruled 
in 1922 that 
the law is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to 
abolish distinctions which ·some citizens draw or account 
for racial differences in relation to their matter of 
purely private concern. For the law to abolish these 
distinctions in private dealings between individuals would 
only accentuate the difficulties (188 N.W. 330). 
The property rights conflict was addressed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the 1926 landmark case, Corrigan v. Buckley, 
{271 u.s. 323). This was the only racial covenant case to 
reach the Supreme court until 1945. The main issue in Corrigan 
involved the power of individuals to record racially restrictive 
covenants: was state court enforcement of covenants state action 
under the 14th Amendment, and if so, was it forbidden because 
it denies blacks the equal protection of the laws? Consistent 
with past decisions, the court gave strong support to the doctrine 
that the 14th Amendment did not apply "to action by individuals 
in respect to their property," as set out in the 1883 civil rights 
cases (Ibid.}, 
Corrigan's impact was significant and most state courts 
followed its guidelines. In Missouri, all courts refused to 
address the constitutional issues claiming that they were resolv-
ed by Corrigan. In perhaps the most influential Kansas City 
case, Porter v. Johnson, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the 
principle of individual property rights. The court expressed 
what was then the universal view regarding the legality of racial 
covenants and their social necessity: 
[individuals] who own a home ••• have a right to protect 
it against ••• elements distasteful to them, and if they 
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favor segregation, should have the confidence in the 
power and willingness of the courts to protect their in-
vestment in happiness and security (115 S.W.2d 529 (1938)). 
Nevertheless, in the wake of Corrigan, opposition was slowly 
mounting to have the covenants overturned on the grounds that 
judicial enforcement of them was state action (Voss, 1959:19). 
It is not surprising that the courts were so slow to address 
the important constitutional issues raised by racial covenants, for 
there were many prominent lawyers who supported them. For ex-
ample, as ··late as 1944, the American Law Institute (ALI), whose 
views are written by leading legal scholars and nationally re-
cognized attorneys, was recommending in its Restatement of Pro-
perty that an exception be made to the general rule regarding 
the free disposal of property when "social conditions render 
desirable the exclusion of the racial or social group in ques-
tion" (Sec. 406:2411-12). Although there was concern that the 
large nwnber of blacks involved as potential conveyees would 
cause some interference with constitutional questions regarding 
the "power of alienation," it was considered less important than 
the "the avoidance of unpleasant racial and social relations 
and the stabilization of the value of land (Ibid.). Their posi-
tion was solidified by the belief that ''public opinion made it 
desirable to exclude "certain racial and social groups" (Ibid.). 
An indication of the ALI' s influence was illustrated when a New 
Jersey Court shortly thereafter declared that the Restatement 
provided the basis for their decision to enforce a +acial 
ce..venant '(Voss~ 1959:20). 
I 
The Restatement's view that race relations benefited by 
segregation was also justified because of the long held belief 
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by the courts and others that racial covenants were necessary 
to protect economic values and render property a more pleasant 
place to live. That the courts may have been more concerned 
with public policy than with constitutional questions is ex-
pressed by one author who ways that 
••• the court believes that the policies favoring restraint 
on alienation outweigh the policies opposed to it, so that 
the state's welfare is better served by allowing the val-
idity of the restraint than by denying it (Ribble, 1930: 
851) I 
Some courts attempted to give the impression of neutrality 
regarding questions of property rights. by declaring that a rem-
edy under law is "equally available" to all litigants regardless 
of race or color" (Ridgway v. Cockburn, 296 N.Y.S. 943 (1937)). 
In other words, blacks could exclude whites, too, if they 
wanted. To illustrate their neutrality, the Missouri Supreme 
Court ruled in Porter that "Negroes have the same right in this 
respect as do those of other races" (Porter v. Johnson, 115 s.w. 
2d 529 (1938)). Indeed, in Los Angeles and Washington, o.c. 
blacks did write covenants in a few instances to exclude whites 
{Voss, 1959). Similarly, in Kansas City, the Huber and Chrysler 
subdivisions were built for blacks and restricted against white 
occupancy (Webster, 1949:51-54). Obviously, restrictions against 
white occupancy were extremely rare, however. There is no evi-
dence showing that blacks ever seriously tried to write such 
agreements or have them enforced. The last thing blacks had 
to worry about was the threat of white residency in their neigh-
borhoods. Racial covenants were clearly a Caucasian innovation 
used to exclude blacks and other minorities. 
Prior to the 1940s, socif>loaical argunents were rarely used 
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in restrictive covenant cases, principally because the courts 
refused to consider anything beyond question of contractual 
and property rights. Such arguments were viewed as bizarre. 
In Missouri, sociological- data was first used in the influen-
tial Porter case (115 S.W.2d 529 (1938)). Carl Johnson was an 
influential black attorney in Kansas City (eventually becoming 
the first black awarded a judgeship in Jackson County) who had 
long fought for black civil rights. In 1935, Johnson moved into 
a corner house at 2602 Tracy that was racially restricted. All 
of the homes on the 2600 block of Tracy were white occupied, 
while all of the three blocks surrounding the block were black 
occupied. A vacant lot directly across the street from 2602 
had at one time been advertised for sale to blacks, but later 
whites tried to place restrictions on the property to afford 
them greater protection. 
Johnson's key arguments were as follows: 1) the enforcement 
of the covenant would place undue hardship on 50,000 Negroes who, 
living in terribly crowded conditions, could not find available 
housing7 2) the court should consider the public policy of 
allowing "only 18 residences to be built for Negro occupancy ••• 
in Kansas City during the last 15 years" (Ibid.,533). The Jack-
son County and Circuit Courts both ruled in favor of Johnson, 
but not becuase of the sociological arguments. Instead, they 
maintained that there had been a "radical change in condition 
to the property in question and not the surrounding area where 
blacks already lived: (Ibid. ,534). The Missouri Supreme court 
overturned, however, saying that a restrictive contract can only 
be terminated be the "written release or conduct of the parties 11 
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(Ibid.). All three courts relied on the traditional view narrow-
ly defining the validity of the racial covenant as a contract 
rather than considering its sociological effect. 
One of the first courts to recognize the relationship of 
sociological data to restrictive covenants.was in 1944 when 
the California Supreme Court ruled, first, that crowded black 
districts are a consequence of residential segregation and, 
second, there is a public interest involved and covenants "must 
yield to the public interest in the sound development of ·the 
whole community" ·(Fairchild v. Raines, 151 Pac.2d 260). A 
couple of years later, the Circuit court of St. Louis also 
addressed sociological conditions in the Shelley case (the same 
one that later reached the U.S. Supreme Court) by focusing on 
the increasing black population of St. Louis (Kraemer v. Shelley, 
355 Mo.814 (1946)). 
Social science studies were .extensively used in 
the Sipes v. McGhee case in Detroit· (25 N.W.2d 638 (1947)). 
Sipes, which was later heard jointly with.Shelley by the u.s. 
Supreme court, was a Detroit case~ The conflict over racial 
covenants in Detroit.was intense. The City was probably the 
scene of more racial violence in the '40s than any other city. 
One study maintained that overcrowding in dwellings was a pri-
mary cause of rioting in Detroit (Lee and Humphrey, 1943). Es-
pecially relevant to the Sipes case was the Report on Negro 
Housing produced by President Hoover's Conference on Home Build-
ing. It stated that 
·residential segregation, which is sought to be maintained 
by court enforcement of the race restrictive covenant ••• 
has kept the Negro occupied [in] sections of cities through-
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out the country ••• {they] are fatally unwholesome places 
••• a menace to the health, morals and general decency of 
cities, plague spots for race expolitation, friction and 
riots {Voss, 1959:138). 
In preparation for the Sipes case, the national office for 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
{NAACP), which supervised the litigation for blacks, based its 
major arguments on studies done in Detroit that would illus-
trate 
b~e. dangers to society which are inherent in the restric-
tion of members of minority groups to overcrowded slum 
areas are so great and so well recognized that a court of 
equity, charged with maintaining the public interest, 
should not, through the exercise of power given to it by 
the people, intensify so dangerous a situation {Ibid.). 
Several amicus curiae briefs were filed by organization who 
sought to support these same points. The American Jewish Con-
gress provided overwhelming documentation that restrictions in 
housing "create overcrowding, poverty, disease, delinquency, 
crime, tensions, and other social evils" (Ibid.,142). 
Even though there was a growing acceptance of such views, 
the old doctrines still held precedence for a few more years. 
When the U.S. Supreme court granted certiorari to McGhee, Shelley, 
and Hurd, Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, said that 
such matters were beyond the authority of the courts and were 
the responsibility of other branches of government {Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 u.s. 1, 824 (1948). Douglas maintained, as had al-
most every previous court, that the real issue was one of con-
tractual rights and not public policy. Six years later,ha-rever, in 
Brown v. Topeka Board of Education, the Court would again 
address similar issues, but this tiJ"t-e ·recognized the adverse psychological 
effect of the duel school system on minorites (347 U.S. 483 
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(1954)). Thus the philosophy of the court had finally-changed. 
THE CHANGED CONDITIONS DOCTRINE 
Turnover in the fringe neighborhoods was rapid, increasing-
ly so each year. This fact, combined with the slowness of the 
judicial process, meant that by the time a racial covenant case 
reached the courts, several more back families had usually moved 
into the neighborhood in question. Thus, while there may have 
been but one or two families moving into an all white block when 
the law suit was filed, by the time it reached the court the 
majority was often black. This became a key issue facing the 
lower courts throughout the history of the racial covenant cases 
and was commonly referred to as the "changed conditions" doc-
trine. The courts were faced with these questions: at what 
point did a white district become a black one? What percent of 
black homeowners was necessary before a district could no long-
er be considered a white one? 
In addressing this issue, the courts scrutinized the inten-
tion, or purpose, of the racial covenant, which was based upon 
legal contractual principle that there was a mutual benefit to 
all parties subject to the agreement. The benefit, of course, 
was derived by excluding blacks from certain specified areas or 
districts. Consequently, when a number of blacks entered a for-
merly all-white district, the benefit principle was both altered 
and challenged. The general ·:tendency of the courts in consider-
ing the changed conditions doctrine.was to refuse to uphold an 
agreement 
when the ne~ghborhood in question has so changed in its 
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character and environment and in the uses to which the 
property therein may be put that the purpose of the cove-
nant cannot be carried out, or that its enforcement would 
substantially lessen the value of the property, or, in 
short, that injunctive relief would not give a benefit 
but rather impose a hardship (Hundley v. Gorowitz, 132 
Fed,2d 24 (1942)), 
The Missouri Supreme court followed the same general rule 
on changed conditions in Pickel v, Mccawley (44 S.W.2d 857 
(1931)), In this case, blacks had purchased homes in a white 
district to such an extent that the white person who tried to 
enforce the covenant was now in the minorityi therefore no rem-
edy was bestowed. The Court reasoned that if complete neighbor-
hood coverage by racial covenant was intended (by the homes 
association) the signatures of all property owners was essential1 
anything less would have defeated the purpose set out by the 
restrictions. When a judgment was finally rendered, only one 
white family remained on the block. (The Missouri Supreme Court 
reached the opposite .conclusion seven years later in the Porter 
v. Johnson case.) Under these circwnstances, the enforcement 
of covenants was ruled inequitable. The courts were therefore 
unlikely to uphold a covenant purporting to protect an all-white 
district that had become largely inhabited by blacks and which 
was now commonly referred to as a "Negro district" (Letteau v. 
Ellis, 10 Pac.2d 496 (1932)). In this regard, it is interesting 
to note that by 1950 the overwhelming majority of land occupied 
by blacks in Kansas City, Missouri, was covered by racial cove-
nants that had not yet expired. This phenomenon occurred in 
1,.7s Angeles, Chicago, and most other northern cities, as well 
(Weaver, 19481236). 
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In Thornhill v. Herdt, another St. Louis case, the Pickel 
doctrine was skirted when those who signed covenants specified 
their intention to be bound, regardless of the non-signers, or 
upon the likelihood that a certain percentage, less than the 
whole, of property owners signed (130 S.W.2d 175 (1939)). On 
the other hand, a California court held that "the number of 
parties to such an agreement is not the test of its validity" 
(Stone v. Jones, 152 Pac.2d 19 (1944)). Also, in contrast, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court believed that a certain percentage 
of signatures was necessary before any property was restricted 
and non-signers, in no instance were bound. These percentages 
varied from 51 percent (Hemsley v. Sage, 154 Pac.2d 577 (1944); 
to 70 percent (Lyons v. Wallen, 133 Pac.2d 555 (1942)); and 
to 90 percent (Hemsley v. Hough, 157 Pac.2d, 182 (1945)). 
A controversial Topeka, Kansas, case provided an exception 
to the commonly accepted rule that if changed conditions were 
outside of a restricted area, no matter how close, the restric-
tion was e.nforceable (Clark v. Vaughn, 131 Kan. 438 (1930)). 
In the Clark case, an individually restricted lot was separated 
from a racially restricted district by a thoroughfare. Sur-
rounding the one restricted lot were unrestricted lots that 
were eventually bought up by blacks. In figure 5 on the next 
page, the owner of lot A, a restricted lot in a group of un-
restricted houses on one side of a thoroughfare, tried to sell 
to blacks because he could not get a fair price from whites. 
Since blacks occupied a few of the unrestricted homes surround-
ing lot A before the restriction was adopted, the Court refused 
to grant an injunction on the grounds that it was "inequitable 
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and burdensome." 
Figure 5 - Example of Clark Rule 
Unrestricted Lots Restricted Lots 
Direction 







The Clark decision was highly unpopular nationally because 
it defied the majority view upholding the sanctity of racial 
covenants. In the above example, the prevailing view would 
hold that lot A adopted restrictions due to anticipated black 
expansion from the neighboring black community; the agreement 
was for protection. Changed conditions outside of a restricted 
district did not make the enforcement of racial covenants in-
equitable (Grady v. Garland, 89 Fed.2d 817 (1937)}. The fact 
that restrictions could not be overturned merely by pointing 
out the presence of a few black families in close proximity to 
a restricted area (Ibid.,819} posed a severe barrier to 
black movement. Proof of sweeping neighborhood changes were 
necessary. Such evidence was not needed in Clark, but similar 
ci.rcumstances were never successfully accepted in other courts 
(Voss, 1959:281. 
A further handicap to blacks existed. This was the reluc-
tance of the courts to overturn covenants even if conditions 
had changed: nvalid and solemn contracts should not be lightly 
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set aside 11 tGrady v. Garland, 89 Fed.2d 819 (1937).}. Con-
tracting parties were therefore obligated to "assume the bur-
dens and benefits, for equity does not grant relief against 
a bad bargain voluntarily made and unbreached" (Vernon v. Rey-
nold Realty Co., 36 S.E.2d 710 (1946)}. 
Another question arose in California over circumstances 
where restricted lots did not form a contiguous area, or when 
the district in question was not completely blanketed with 
racial restrictions (_Foster v. Stewart, 25 Pac.2d 497 (1933)). 
This was a common situation. The key question presented was 
whether owners without restrictions could be protected from 
intruding blacks when owners·of adjacent lots were free to 
sell or rent to non-whites: Figure 6 below illustrates 
this condition. Six non-contiguous homes are restricted and 
three unrestricted homes have been purchased by blacks. Under 
the changed conditions rule, could the homeowners in the re-
stricted lots prevent the remaining white homeowners from 
selling to blacks who have moved into unrestricted homes, 
claiming that the intention of their restrictive agreement, 
although not signed by 100 percent of the homeowners, was to 
cover the entire neighborhood? 












Could the three black families be ordered to leave by the courts 
on the basis that they were living in a white district? The 
courts, on the one hand, sought to determine whether the in-
tention of owners whose lots were restricted was to exclude 
blacks from the remaining unrestricted lots as well; on the 
other hand, the courts considered whether the fact that blacks, 
who had already moved into unrestricted homes in the neighbor-
hood, prevented any future mutual benefit and thus destroyed 
the purpose of the covenant. According to Foster, in the 
above example, the black families would have to move out be-
cause the white residents still constituted a majority and the 
purpose of the covenant was therefore still possible. 
SHELLEY V. KRAEMER 
In 1945, the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari 
for the racial covenant case, Mays v. Burgess (.325 U.S. 868). 
Th.en in 1947, certiorari was granted when St. Louis attorneys 
filed a petition for the Shelley case. Accordingly, the NAACP 
national office in New York quickly did the same for the 
McGhee v. Sipes case in Detroit. Several months later, cer-
tiorari was also granted for two District of Columbia cases, 
Hurd v. Hodge and Urciolo v. Hodge. Thus the U.S. Supreme 
Court consolidated two state cases and two federal cases. 
The petitioners, however, took separate courses of action. 
For McGhee, a lengthy and persuasive brief based on sociological 
arguments was prepared. On the other hand, the attorneys for 
Shelley relied on the standard argument that judicial enforce-
ment of racial covenants is state action contrary to public 
policy and the U.S. Constitution. Charles Houston, a remarkable 
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black Washington attorney, handled the Federal cases by blend-
ing both the sociological and legal arguments. 
Justice Vinson, acting for the majority, first addressed 
the petitioners claim that judicial enforcement of the restric-
tive covenants violated rights guaranteed by the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The question of Court 
enforcement had not been raised in the 1925 Corrigan v. Buckley 
case, only the validity of covenants was reviewed. Vinson 
determined that covenants were directed toward a specific 
class 
defined wholly in terms of race or color ••• [and] among 
the civil rights intended to be protected from discrim-
inatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are 
the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of pro-
perty" (334 U.S. 1 at 10 (1948)) 
Vinson further believed that while the formation of restrictive 
covenants was by private action, judicial enforcement of them 
amounted to state action: 
It is clear that but for the active intervention of 
the state courts, supported by the full panoply of 
state power, the petitioners would have been free to 
occupy the properties in question without restraint 
(.Ibid. L 
"REACTION TO SHELLEY 
The black community in Kansas City heralded Shelley as 
the most significant decision for blacks since the Proclama-
tion (KC Call, June 6, 19471. Their hopes were, however, 
dashed somewhat by the subsequent uncertainty and controversy 
over the legal· interpretation of the decision, not to mention 
.....,..; 
I 
the unwillingness of many to accept the ruling. One glaring 
loophole in Shelley was Justice Vinson's belief that while 
raci.al agreements may not be enforced, it was perfectly lawful 
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to make them and to observe their terms so long as the obser-
vance was purely voluntary. Many felt therefore that the 
effect of the decision was to leave landowners with a perfectly 
valid contract, but the breach of it left no available remedy 
(Livermore, 1949:493}. 
Not surprisingly, attorneys in Kansas City and elsewhere 
continued to routinely insert racial clauses into title deeds, 
as if nothing had happened; business as usual. There was no 
pressure, or reason, for them to do otherwise. The lawyers 
who drafted covenants, their clients, land developers, et al., 
were well aware that the average person wuld not know that the 
racial covenant found in their title deed was unenforce-
able. Thus the presence of racial covenants in title deeds 
could provide considerable moral or psychological effect upon 
prospective purchasers (Mccasland, 1949:679-681). 
Throughout the 1950s legal scholars debated the meaning 
of Shelley. A few maintained the traditional view that 
Shelley was unconstitutional simply because it denied indi-
viduals of their right to property. One such person was Al-
bert L. Reeves, a Federal District Court judge in Kansas City 
during this period. While speaking at a Kansas City Bar 
Association luncheon at the Hotel Phillips, he expressed his 
displeasure with Shelley, and echoed the views of many others, 
by stating that " ••• in this broad land the time should never 
come wh.en private citizens should not enjoy the right to say 
.)Ifie their neighbors shall be. Extremes of race cannot live ·, 
comfortably side by side ••• " (KC Call, 19491. Blacks were not 
only angry about Reeves' opinions, they were upset because 
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an important judge had openly defied his oath to defend the 
highest court in the land (Ibid.). 
Numerous journal and law review articles were written re-
garding the possible ways one might circumvent Shelley. One 
such article was written by the former governor of Kansas, 
Robert Bennett, who in the early 1950s was a young attorney 
in Overland Park, Kansas. It was Bennett's belief that a racial 
covenant is valid until one of the parties decides to terminate 
it tl953:86-93l. In effect, this means that most of the cov-
enants written years ago with racial restrictions are still 
binding today. 
Although Shelley was controversial, it did clear up one 
important question: explicit racial agreements would not be 
tolerated in the courts. In the future, proponants of segre-
gation were forced to use more subtle methods of excluding 
blacks. As a result, a variety of elaborate schemes were de-
vised to circumvent Shelley. 
ME.THODS OF CIRCUMVENTION 
One commonly used technique was to eliminate references 
to minorities and make restrictions limiting the number of per-
sons per room, proper care of premises, lot size, cost of house, 
and so forth. (_Livermore, 1949: 4931. Such restrictions became 
popularly known as "community conservation agreements" (Ibid.). 
Although used by developers like J.C. Nichols for years, they 
now became very popular because it was thought that the restric-
tions would provide a practical answer that could accomplish 
the. same. thing as racial covenants. Today their usage is wide-
spre.ad in suburban areas and there is a wealth of evidence to 
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suggest that they have been successful in excluding blacks, 
although the courts have not readily accepted the view, until 
recently, that such restrictions are "exclusionary" unless 
against the "general welfare of the region (Southern Burling-
ton County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A2d. 713 
(19751). 
In addition, restrictions on lot size, etc., did not pro-
tect against well-to-do blacks, the ones most likely to move 
into suburban white neighborhoods. To counter this deficiency, 
exclusive property owners' associations were formed to control 
the admission of new residents. Some of the techniques they 
used to insure sales to "appropriate"· buyers include the follow-
ing (Samuel Jackson testimony, October 10, 1963): 
ll A "lease of property" is made when subdivisions are 
built, but title remains with the building corporation. A 
board of directors determines the sale of properties. Two 
communities, one in Kansas City, Kansas, and the one in Kansas 
City, Missouri, both practiced this method. 
2)_ Title remainanwith the resident, but a sale could not 
be made without a board of directors approval. 
3} A "permit committee" was set up and residents were re-
quired to get a permit from the neighborhood committee before 
a sale could be made. 
41 Sales were made only after approval by the builder or 
owner of the initial purchase contract. 
51 Sales could be made only after approval by the owner 
of an adjacent lot. 
61 Neighborhood improvement associations would set up a 
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a sinking fund to purchase homes from blacks who had recently 
bought in white neighborhoods. 
7) Property is owned under a "land trust arrangement plan" 
which gives owners control over the operation and management 
of all property within a subdivision (Heard, Jr., 1948:44). 
Most of the above examples fall under one of two general 
classifications: the "right of first refusal," and "buy-back" 
provisions. The right of first refusal simply means that a 
third party, usually neigbors, a homes association, or a 
builder/developer, has the right to refuse any proposed sale. 
An example of the language found in a typical right of first 
refusal would state that 
if the original purchaser of a lot from the developer 
decides to sell said lot ••• he must sell to adjacent 
property or lot owners on his right or left, unless 
he obtains a release from them in writing (Jackson 
County Record Books (Independence), Woodridge Subdivi-
sion, 1969,book 107:540). 
Buy back provisions went one step further by allowing an out-
right purchase of the property if a sale is not satisfactory 
to neighbors, the homes association, or developer (whichever 
is indicated by the deed}. A typical buy back provision would 
state that 
no sale of said lots shall be consumated without at 
least a 15 days written notice to the proprietors and 
the owners of the two lots adjoining lot on the sides, 
of the terms thereof, and any of them shall have the 
right to buy said lot on such. terms within 15 days, 
by giving notice to the sellers of their intentions 
••• (.Ibid., Harvest Village, 1968, book I-17:1305). 
Examples of each of these clauses have occurred in Kansas 
City with some regularity, as many subdivisions include them 
in the original title deed. John Dwyer, of the Chicago Title 
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Company, states that about two-thirds of the subdivisions under 
the Independence section of Jackson County Courthouse records 
(everything outside of Kansas City, Missouri} 9ontain these 
clauses (Interview, 1978). This includes areas that were 
built up after 1950 and the Shelley decision: Independence 
south, Lee Summit, Raytown, Hickman Mills, Grandview, Blue 
Springs, etc. They are less commonly found on the Kansas side. 
Although Chicago Title should have a good idea of the types of 
restrictions written into title deeds, the survey of deeds for 
this thesis failed to reveal as pervasive a coverage of these 
clauses in suburban Jackson County. During an eight year 
period from 1967 to 1975, only 25 subdivisions were found to 
contain these clauses, and they were generally for more "exclu-
sive" developments. 
THE DAMAGES ISSUE 
In addition to the "non-explicit" practices that followed 
Shelley, the question of "damages" remained unanswered. The 
issue facing the courts was twofold: first, could damages be 
enforced through private action any more than an injunction, 
as provided for in Shelley? Second, presuming enforcement was 
possible, how would the court measure the damages? 
In Kansas City, the Jackson County circuit court simultane-
ously reviewed several damages cases on properties located at 
2630 E. 29th, 2639-41 Benton Boulevard, 2944 Victor Place, and 
one other home in the vicinity. Judge Ben Terte ruled that 
the cases were an attempt to circumvent Shelley (KC Call, Jan-
uary 21, 1949}. The plaintiffs filed for an amended petition, 
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but the earlier motions were sustained by Judge James Broaddus 
on the basis that no liability could ensue on the part of white 
persons who violate restrictive agreements (KC Call, April 8, 
1949}. The opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court, however, 
differed. Six cases asking for damages reached various state 
supreme courts, including Missouri's. Only Missouri and Okla-
homa ruled that the enforcement of damages, under the Shelley 
doctrine, was constitutional (Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1943 
(.1949 l}. The Missouri Court reasoned in Weiss that restric-
tive covenants wri'tten by white citizens were valid and enforce-
able under law because the remedy, damages, did not injure the 
right of blacks to obtain property equally with whites. They 
reached this conclusion largely because no legal action was 
ever brought against blacks in damage suits. Instead, whites 
were always pitted against whites. 
The Oklahoma and Missouri decisions were widely criticized 
in law review articles. In addition, the black community in 
Kansas City felt that the effect of the decision was to inhibit 
white owners from selling to blacks for fear of a law suit 
(KC Call, December 23, 1949}. Not until 1953 did the U.S. Su-
preme Court intervene and attempt to clarify the issue by hear-
ing a damages case from Los Angeles. 
BARROWS V. JACKSON 
Barrows and some other whites brough.t a damage suit in Los 
.. Angeles against Leola Jackson, a white neighbor, for selling to 
'1 
a black. Barrows claimed that their property was "materially 
depreciated in value" and therefore had become "less attractive 
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as a residential area (346 U.S. 255 (.1953}. It was clear 
that enforcing the covenant would involve state action, but 
the critical question was whether allowing damages would de-
prive anyone of their constitutional rights. The Court ruled 
that, indirectly, blacks were the ones who would occupy and 
use the property, so the result was a denial of equal protec-
tion (Ibid., 249,260). Indeed, the NAACP and several other 
black organizations helped defend Mrs. Jackson, a white, be-
cause they felt it was in their interest to do so since the 
explicit purpose of the damages suits was to exclude blacks 
(.Voss, 1959: 243-246). 
Vinson, who wrote the majority opinion in Shelley, feeling 
that the subject had been adequately covered there, dissented 
in Barrows saying the Shelley rule must be applied; that is, 
no direct damage was caused to blacks (346 U.S. 264). While 
Vinson believed the restrictive covenants were struck down in 
Shelley because they deprived blacks of property solely because 
of race, in Barrows he thought no blacks were damaged because 
the suit was brought against Mrs. Jackson, a white, which left 
blacks free to stay on the property, undisturbed (Ibid.,262). 
Shortly after the Barrows decision, a futile attempt was 
made by Barrows for a rehearing. Property owners' associa-
tions from all over the country jointly signed a brief support-
ing the petitioners. Among the signers was the Santa Fe Place 
Improvement Association in Kansas City, Missouri tVoss, 1959: 
2441. It is worth noting the desparate nature of the 
arguments made in the property owners' brief; also, how they 
now stress usociological" evidence rather than constitutional, 
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thus indicating that they were now on the defensive for the 
first time. They argued as follows: 
1) The loss in property values due to the presence of 
blacks was as real as those caused by fire or other 
disaster; 
2) Restrictive covenants are a defense for the protec-
tion of the rights of racial classes: 
3) Restrictive covenants are not inhuman, but instead 
represent a fact of life--races are different and 
should remain separate; 
4) Restrictive covenants protect whites against the 
high rate of crime committed by blacks; 
5) The true intention of blacks is not to occupy homes 
in white neighborhoods, but to inter-marry (Ibid.). 
The Barrows decision was another important turning point 
for blacks and the courts interpretation of their rights. 
Legal precedent was no longer overwhelmingly white. The 
slow change was due to a variety of inter-related reasons. 
One explanation is that the Roosevelt Court increasingly saw 
itself as an arm of the government and began to oversee and 
enforce government actions. For example, all other previous 
courts had tended to view the restrictive covenant cases as 
private actions, as they did even in the landmark Shelley 
case. In the Barrows decision, however, the Supreme Court 
finally agreed that black rights under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were being unduly restricted. Another change is that 
while the discrimination caused by private actions had previ-
ously gained support through court enforcement, the restrictive 
covenant cases involving individual actions had now evolved 
into class actions. It was inevitable. The courts could no 
longer ignore the obvious: not just one black family was being 
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denied housing by ·private restrictive agreements, but an entire 
black race. For years blacks had been trying, unsuccessfully, 
to show that the racial covenants had been largely responsible 
for crowded, slum housing and now the courts were agreeing. 
"Civil Rights" was now the important issue facing the courts. 
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CHAPTER 4 - THE ROLE OF LENDERS AND REALTORS 
Racially restrictive covenants were strongly supported 
by the policies and practices of several key actors; namely, 
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), lenders, and real-
tors. Local lenders supported racial segregation through two 
explicit policies: first, by lending to blacks only in areas 
that contained no racial restrictions; second, by refusing to 
finance the construction of housing for blacks in all loca-
tions, sometimes even in black neighborhoods. This guaranteed 
that blacks live in older housing no longer wanted by whites. 
The general rule in transitional neighborhoods, where the above 
rules were not always clear-cut, was to deny a loan to the first 
black to enter an all-white area. Once a black moved in, however, 
lenders no longer considered it a white area (Webster, 1948:46). 
These practices'remained unchanged throughout the 1950s and 
1960s. In his testimony before the Kansas Conference on Dis-
crimination in Real Property held in 1963, Don Sewing, a suc-
cessful black realtor who started in the field in the mid 1950s, 
related an incident in which he went to the Anchor Savings and 
Loan with an application to get financing for a white client who 
wanted to purchase a home on the northeast corner of 9th and 
Quindaro in Kansas City, Kansas. The lender told him no because 
theblC>C£ was unbroken. Sewing explained that his client was 
white; the lender said, in that case, he would be glad to con-
sider the loan. 
~, Several generations of blacks went without access to any type 
of financing for housing. There were no black lenders in the 
Kansas City area until 1947 when the Douglas State Bank was 
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opened {by Don Sewing's father) in Kansas City, Kansas (Sewing 
interview, 1978). The .Douglas, however, was a small volume 
operation that was hard pressed to satisfy the black demand for 
mortgage loans (Tillman testimony, October 10, 1963). Other 
mortgage lenders, observing good business and lending practices, 
opposed any change in racial policies until forced to by decree 
{Weaver, 1948:237). Recent red-lining surveys in Kansas City, 
Missouri, verify that a disproportionate share of loans are 
still going to suburban locations, even from inner city lenders 
{KC Star, April 16, 1978:l and July 8, 1980:1). Not only do 
such policies deny blacks mortgage loans, their deposits are 
being used to aid suburban development, areas still largely 
uninhabited by blacks. Many of the policies and practices of 
local lenders in Kansas City are directly related to those of 
the FHA. 
THE FEDERAL HOUSING AUTHORITY 
The country's major mortgage lender from 1934 on has ·been 
the FHA. Their policies, perhaps more than any other factor, 
helped institutionalize the racial covenant. Because they 
adopted the. racial agreate1t as an official policy, every other 
institution involved in housing was obliged to act accordingly. 
For example, the suburban mass production of housing by develop-
ers was made possible in two ways: (1 FHA insurance guarantees 
of long-term low interest mortgage loans were made available to 
millions of white homeb~yers;2)developers were able to get 
major commitments of mortgage insurance in advance of construc-
tion enabling them to borrow enough money to build hundreds of 
homes at one time with every confidence that they would have 
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buyers (McEntire, 1960:177). 
Even though racial covenants were not a public control, they 
provided the FHA with the most efficacious way of excluding 
blacks prior to 1948. In 1938, Section 137 of the FHA Manual 
stated that 
••• if the children of people living in an area are com-
pelled to attend school where the majority or a goodly 
number of the pupils represent a far lower level of 
society or incompatible racial element, the neighbor-
hood under consideration will prove far less stable 
than if this condition did not exist (USCCR, 1973:23). 
As a result, appraisers were advised to lower their rating of 
properties in neighborhoods occupied by "inharmonious racial 
or nationality groups ••• "(Ibid.). Moreover, old policies do 
not easily die. As recently as 1975, the McMichael's apprais-
ing manual, which is commonly used by realtors, lenders, public 
and private appraisers, still contained a listing of ethnic 
groups ranked in descending order from those who are most 
desirable to those who have the most adverse effect on pro-
perty values. .Mutes are ranked at the top of the list while 
blacks and Mexican-Americans are ranked at the very bottom 
(Missouri Housing Development Commission, 1978:11). Similarly, 
it was not until 1965 that the FHA formally ceased to prac-
tice red lining and it was 1968 before any effective action 
was taken to make mortgage insurance available to red lined 
areas (U.S. Senate Hearing, 1971:2755). In this respect, a 
Civil Rights Commission representative in 1966, after weeks 
of observing FHA appraisers in Chicago, concluded that there 
were three types of houses FHA absolutely would not insure: 
homes next to factories: homes built on cedar posts: and a 
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home in a white neighborhood into which a black proposed to 
move (Polikoff, 1978:18). 
To further insure racial harmony, a model restrictive cove-
nant was recommended by the FHA Manual prescribing the "enforce-
ment of proper zoning regulations and appropriate deed restric-
tions" (USCCR, 1973:23). The Manual also stressed the consider-
ation of whether the property to be insured was protected 
against "adverse influences." In the case of undeveloped land, 
valuators were instructed in Section 980 to determine whether 
effective restrictive covenants are recorded against 
the entire tract, since these provide the surest pro-
tection against undesirable encroachment and inhar-
monious use. To be most effective, deed restrictions 
should be imposed upon all land in the immediate envi-
ronment of the subject locations (FHA Manual, 1938). 
The policy set out by the FHA underwriting manual therefore 
strongly discouraged racially mixed neighborhoods. The FHA 
could easily enforce the policy simply by withholding loan 
guarantees to violators (USCCR, 1973:21). Consequently, it is 
not surprising that private operators seeking to secure FHA 
backing usually followed the practice set out by the FHA and 
the lending agency (Sterner, 1943:313 and Webster, 1949:45). 
When racial covenants were outlawed in 1948, the FHA 
received considerable pressure to adopt a new policy. They did 
not do so willingly. Finally, after more than a year, and 
President Truman's insistance, the FHA complied by requiring 
that insurance be withheld if, after February 15, 1950, a 
racial restriction was attached to the piece of property in 
question (Voss, 1959:226). Of particular interest was their 
decision not to apply the new policy to covenants already in 
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existence. The new policy was therefore an ineffective step 
in discouraging the continued observance of racial covenants. 
In Kansas City, the courthouse record books for each of the 
six counties in the metropolitan area show page after page 
of racial restrictions filed between the announcement date 
and the February 15th deadline. Developers were obviously 
anxious to get their subdivisions racially restricted before 
the FHA deadline. Of further importance is that many of these 
subdivisions were huge tracts of undeveloped land, owned and 
restricted by a single landowner. 
Needless to say, controversy developed over the intentions 
of the FHA under the new February 15 guidelines. In an attempt 
to clarify the new policy, the FHA Commissioner, Franklin 
Richards, predicted little change in FHA activities due to the 
new order (New York .Times, December 4, 1949: 84). Indeed, FHA 
continued to refuse loans to blacks seeking housing in white 
areas. They also continued to grant insurance on restricted 
property. Furthenmre, they· made·· it clear to real tors that they 
did not object to so-called "gentlemen's agreements" or 
other arrangements requiring the approval of sales by neighbors 
or the board of a neighborhood group (Orfield, 1974-75:788). 
Amazingly, it was not until 1962 that the FHA went on record 
to officially say that racial discrimination in housing is con-
trary to federal housing policy (Executive Order No. 11063, 
1959-63:652) • 
• What effect did the FHA policy changes have on black hous-
ing choice after Shelley? The United States Commission on Civil 
Rights in 1975 declared that their actions had a negligible 
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effect on black housing choice (1975:41). As late as 1959, 
it is estimated that less than two percent of the FHA insured 
housing used nationally for the post WWII housing boom was made 
available to minorities (USCCR, 1967:5), and most of this was 
on a segregated basis (USCCR, 1973:126). The record of the 
Veterans' Administration (VA), the other major lender following 
the war, was no better. Millions of white families were able 
to buy their first home due to the favorable terms offered them 
by the FHA and the VA, while blacks received no such opportunity. 
Conventional financing, other than FHA and VA, offered no 
better alternative to blacks. Conventional ·financing was super-
vised by federal agencies such as the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board, whose policy was to favor racial homogeneity (USCCR 
Hearings, 1961:735). By 1961, only one of the four federal 
agencies that regulated conventional lenders had even bothered 
to adopt regulations condemning discrimination in mortgage 
lending (USCCR Report, 1961:31-53). 
The 1968 Housing Act brought many changes to FHA's policy, 
the most important being to shift its focus from suburban loca-
tions to central city ones. The main program, Section 235 
housing, was replete with scandal; foreclosures were commonplace. 
Furthermore, if the intentions of FHA were now to promote minor-
ity housing opportunities, builders and owners who participated 
in federally sponsored programs nevertheless continued to oper-
ate in the same discriminatory manner as they had in the past 
(USCCR, 1975:41). 
Did lenders· derive their discriminatory policies from the 
predominent community view that wanted to see segregation 
88 
enforced and maintained? In the absence of racial covenants, 
employment discrimination, and so forth, would lenders have 
given blacks fair and equal treatment or would they have refused 
loans to blacks without any community press~re? One study on 
Kansas City suggests that in the absence of .racial covenants 
and gentleman's agreements "the Negroes economic position and 
the home he wished to purchase might both have been of a quality 
which would have been favorably viewed by lending institutions" 
(City Developement Department, Kansas City, Missouri, 1969:20). 
It is the view here that segregation had become so institutional-
ized that even if one segment, lenders, had chosen not to par-
ticipate, they would have been helpless to do so. Racial cove-
nants and agreements gave legal sanction to segregative practices 
that engulfed the entire housing industry, making it imperative 
that everyone comply, even if unwillingly. 
THE ROLE OF REALTORS 
Realtors are often called the single most important force 
contributing to racial segregation due to their ability to 
selectively determine in which locations buyers will be shown 
homes. Virtually everyone depends upon them to buy or sell a 
home. The unwillingness of realtors to make their services 
available to blacks and other minorities has had the effect 
of creating separate housing markets. Historically, the policy 
of real estate boards, both locally and ·nationally·. has been to 
oppose the entry of non-white persons into all-white neigh-
borhoods. With only occasional exceptions, real estate brokers 
have been, and remain, unwilling to negotiate the sale or rental 
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of property to minority persons, unless the areas are considered 
appropriate; that is, where minorities already live. Realtors 
consider doing otherwise an unethical practice. 
One of the earliest records encouraging this policy was 
recorded in 1917 by the Chicago Real Estate Board when they pro-
posed a plan for Chicago. 
The old Negro districts are overflowing and new territory 
must be furnished ••• it is desired in the interest of all, 
that each block shall be filled solidly and further ex-
pansion shall be confined to contiguous blocks, and that 
the present method of obtaining a single building in 
scattered blocks be discontinued (McEntire, 1960:240). 
Clearly, realtors in Chicago, and elsewhere,largely determined 
the direction of black movement and the pattern of expansion 
funneling blacks into blocks adjacent to the areas in which they 
were allowed to live. Many long-time black residents of Kansas 
City, Missouri, are convinced that the southeasterly, block by 
block movement of the black section is not a purely voluntary 
phenomenon, but rather the result of a well planned design by 
realtors and lenders (Bryant, Fields, and Thomas interviews, 1978). 
By 1924, the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) 
adopted Article 34 of the Code of Ethics. It stated that 
a realtor should never ••• introduc[e] into a neighborhood 
••• members of any race, nationality, or an individual 
whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property 
values in that neighborhood • 
. Local boards follow the policies advocated by the National Board 
and this accounts for the highly uniform racial practices observed 
among real estate brokers in all sections of the country 
(McEntire, 1960:239). As a consequence, local boards all o,,er 
the country, including the Kansas City Real Estate Board (KCREB), 
adopted the intent of the language found in Article 34 (Sewing 
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interview, 1978). By 1950, reference to "race, nationality, 
or any individual" was anitted from Article 34 and the phrase 
"a character of property ••• " was substituted (McEntire, 1960:240). 
The intent nevertheless remained the same and for years thereafter 
few changes occurred in realtor practices. 
One legal scholar wrote in 1948 that in Indianapolis, as in 
most cities, the restrictive covenants were so firmly supported 
by extra-legal sanctions imposed by realtors, lenders and the 
public that the covenants themselves were of no great significance 
(Frank, 24). In other words, three forces were responsible for 
determining black location: 1) the realtors' code of ethics; 
2) the inability to obtain credit for a mortgage even if a sale 
was made; 3) community pressure on white sellers once it became 
·known that a black was buying. If these were inadequate, the 
fourth line of defense against black movement was the racial 
covenant, but, in Indianapolis, there was no one instance where 
a black got through the other three barriers; no law suits were 
ever filed because no sales were allowed outside of the per-
mitted sections (Ibid., 24-26). 
The custom of setting deadlines, which has previously been 
discussed, was fully supported by realtors in Kansas City. In 
1930, the KCREB completed an extensive study of housing in 
Kansas City. The report recommended that 
••• a definite boundary line in the Negro distr~ct be 
recognized ••• and that real estat7 m7n lend.their en-
couragement to improvement.ass~ciatio~s which at present 
are seeking to keep their districts white (KC Call, June 
13, 1930). 
The influence of local real estate boards is further illus-
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trated in St. Louis. The local board there appointed a Committee 
on the Protection of Property and directed them to cooperate 
with improvement associations so that racial restrictions could 
be maintained (Long and Johnson, 1944:69). One study of St. 
Louis in the 1940s found that the St. Louis Board was responsible 
for drafting about 85 percent of the racial covenants in force in 
the city; the Board maintained a trustee interest in the agree-
ments (Ibid.). 
The Shelley decision was widely criticized and opposed by the 
real estate industry as an infringement upon the free housing 
market. The decision itself did little to change the minds of 
most realtors and the way they operated. In fact, they became 
a more important force in fostering and maintaining segregation. 
Gerald Seegers, the attorney who represented Kraemer, et al., in 
the Shelley case, described how the decision would effect realtors 
in St. Louis. 
The method now being employed here in St. Louis ••• is 
to have the Real Estate Exchange [Board] zone the city 
and forbid any member of the exchange under pain of ex-
pulsion to sell property in the white zone to a Negro. 
If the real estate men refused to participate in the 
sale, the breaches will at least be minimized to those 
who deal with each other directly or through a ••• non-
member of the exchange who could easily be identified 
and boycotted more or less by all the people to whom the 
knowledge comes (Voss, 1959:223). 
The response of realtor boards to the decision brought about 
a rash of expulsions in cities throughout the country (Ibid., 224). 
Some boards even sought a Constitutional Amendment to reverse the 
decision (McEntire, 1960:246). Although most boards no longer 
publicly advocate explicit segregation, certainly not discrimina-
tion, in 1973, the Florida Real Estate Licensing Commission was 
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still recommending residential segregation in its handbook for 
brokers (Sloane, 1974:88). Other boards were attacking every 
anti-discrimination bill or law as a "wanton invasion of basic 
property rights" (McEntire, 1960:248). In Kansas City, the Real 
Estate Board actively opposed all housing legislation that pro-
posed to open up the suburbs to blacks. In the late 1960s when 
fair housing proposals were being made everywhere, the KCREB 
publicly campaigned against them, charging that they were a 
denial of property rights. The Board forced a referendum on the 
issue in Kansas City, Missouri, and the fair housing bill was 
defeated. Only the subsequent passage of federal legislation 
overcame this defeat. 
The law has not brought about one important change in realtor 
practices: the code of ethics is still enforced by informal 
pressures. The strong belief remains that opening up white neigh-
borhoods would seriously damage a real estate firms reputation 
(Sewing interview, 1978). Damaging reactions to such actions are 
expected from both neighborhood residents and from colleagues. 
The result is a high degree of uniformity both in realtor atti-
tudes and practices. Although explusions sometimes occured. 
during the 1950s for violating racial codes, such a serious step 
is rarely needed today; the loss of reputation, lack of cooperation 
from colleagues, and the potential loss of business is usually 
sufficient to hold realtors in check (Ibid.). 
The commitment of realtors to uphold the social and economic 
values of the community through the maintenance of homogeneous 
nei;llborhoods is a strong one. In 1961, the Advisory Committee 
from Kansas to the United States Commission on Civil Rights heard 
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~he testimony of one local realtor who insisted that "the preser-
vation of racial, even the religious character of neighborhoods 
is a valid and important objective of his profession" (1961:160). 
The method by which realtors act to accomplish their goal 
of homogeneity is commonly referred to as "steering," a phenom-
enon that occurs when whites are shown homes only in white areas 
and blacks only in black areas. This practice is well recognized 
both nationally and in Kansas City (Temporary Advisory Committee 
on Housing Report, 1973:LV). Realtors generally disclaim charges 
of steering by saying that they act on the wishes of their prin-
cipal client, usually the seller (Curls, Sewing, and Wimrnes inter-
views, 1978). To operate in a manner that is unacceptable to the 
social mores of their customers is, they say, simply bad business. 
Furthermore, they feel no responsibility to crusade for integra-
tion (Sewing interview, 1978). Nor do realtors feel guilty for 
their behavior. They place the burden of guilt on the public: 
if the seller will readily agree to accept a black buyer, brokers 
say they will comply. Evidence suggests, however, that the deci-
sions of realtors are made independently of the seller. McEntire 
wrote in 1960 that there is 
••• abundant evidence that brokers and their boards take 
an independent view of their responsibilities and will 
refuse to participate in transactions violating their 
mores regardless of the wishes of individual buyers 
and s~llers ••• there is no recorded instance of any real 
estate board's announcing that introduction of a minority 
buyer into a white neighborhood was permissable if the 
seller is willing (241). 
Supporting evidence to this view was provided after extensive 
hearings were held ~n 1961 by the·USCCR in·several major cities. 
They concluded that real estate brokers continue to adhere to the 
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policy of single race occupancy, and that 
their v~ews in some cases are so vigorously expressed 
as to discourage property owners who would otherwise be 
conce~ned only with color of a purchaser's money, and 
not with that of his skin ••• his policies and practices 
are among the foremost influences that determine where 
the various racial and religious groups live. 
When the Commission again held hearings in 1970, one broker from 
Baltimore testified that realtors actually encourage the white 
preference for exclusivity • 
••• it is not the homeowner who is making the decision 
to keep a neighborhood all-white for his friends and 
neighbors, so much [as] the real estate broker who is 
in business and who still considers it economic suicide 
to make a sale to blacks in an all-white neighborhood 
(1974:16). 
It is safe to say, moreover, that the attitudes of realtors 
today have scarcely changed. Robert Moore, Jr., the Executive 
Vice-President of the Kansas Association of Realtors in 1978, 
responded to a Kansas City Star editorial entitled "The Right to 
Buy A House," by stating that 
••• a real estate broker or sales person works as an agent 
for the seller. I can assure you that if there is racial 
bias in the sale of a house, the fault lies with the 
seller and not the agent in 90 to 95 percent of the 
cases (KC Star, June 9:23). 
Another common practice of the real estate industry which has 
helped maintain segregation (although not used as blatantly in the 
1970s) is the process of encouraging and expediting the racial 
transition of neighborhoods, commonly referred to as "blockbusting." 
According to Gunnar Myrdal in his 1944 study of racial discrimina-
tion, the first foothold by blacks in a white neighborhood was by 
accident, with no help from realtors. Property was deeded to an 
absentee landlord who had no interest whatever in the racial make-
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up of the neighborhood. Then realtors took over and they were 
gladly willing to sell to blacks at a profit (636). 
Up to a point, realtors generally tried to hold the "line" 
in fringe neighborhoods against black infiltration. After a 
black crossed the line, however, unscrupulous real estate agents 
wrote off the neighborhoods, reversed their tactics and worked to 
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bring in as many blacks as possible while persuading whites to 
leave •. The Kansas State Advisory Committee to the USCCR reported 
in 1961 that 
there is little doubt that realtors will generally 
nei,:thex:, show nor sell a house on an all-white block to 
a Negro. If, by one means or another, a block is 'broken,' 
the tendency will be to attempt to convert the entire 
block to Negro occupancy (160). 
Blockbusting has never been publicly condoned by the KCREB, yet 
until the past few years, it was widely used in Kansas City by 
realtors and posed a serious housing problem to blacks and whites 
alike (Davis and Schecter interviews, 1978). One local black 
realtor that was interviewed openly discussed his involvement in 
aiding white realtors and sellers to arrange "midnight deals" in 
neighborhoods undergoing rapid turnover (Curls, 1978). Until the 
late 1960s or early 1970s, many realtors, black and white, were 
often unwilling to forego the temptation of individual profit 
that Could be derived from the rapid turnover of property in 
transitional neighborhoods. As a result, entire blocks of whites 
in Kansas City were vacated within a few weeks or even days 
(KC Star, July 22, 1964:1D). 
Classified sections of local newspapers have followed the 
lead of the real estate industry by carrying discriminatory 
advertising. For years the Kansas City Star has attempted to 
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separate ads for the black district by advertising residential 
property "east of Troost," and "west of Troost," a line which 
today, for the most part, still divides the black and white 
communities. Property is also advertised "north of 27th Street" 
and "south of 27th Street" and "no:tth of Brush Creek to 27th 
Street" and "south of Brush Creek." These streets have long 
been considered dividing lines. Many blacks rely on the Kansas 
City Call, which, until recently, advertised in areas only where 
blacks reportedly were able to purchase housing (City Develop-
Ment Department, KCMO, 1969). Similarly, the Kansas City Kansan 
advertised property by listing it as "available to anyone," or 
"for anyone." These designations were separated from the others 
by dotted lines. In 1966, the Executive Director of the Commis-
sion of Human Relations in Kansas City, Kansas, investigated this 
practice and concluded that the intent was to separate black and 
white listings (See Appendix B). The Kansan readily admitted that 
this was their intention. 
Still another aspect of race and the real estate industry con-
cerns the exclusion of blacks from professional associations and 
real estate boards. The National Association has left local 
board membership up to the local boards, but has recommended, at 
least until recently, that blacks organize their own boards 
(McEntire, 1960:249). Consequently, blacks were forced to form 
their own national board and respective local boards. In Kansas ,_. 
City, blacks were not permitted as nernbers of the KCREB prior to 
1968,~ In the late 1940s, they formed their own board and called 
themselves "Realtists" (Sewing interview, 1978), a name coined 
because white boards all over the country protested that blacks 
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were unfairly categorized as "realtors" along with whites. Some-
time after 1968, blacks were able to join the main board in Kansas 
City, but as of 1973 there were only nine blacks out of 2,500 
members (Kansas and Missouri State Advisory Committees to the 
USCCR, 1973:28), testimony to the racial attitudes that persist 
within the real estate industry today. The absence, or exclusion, 
continues to represent a denial of wider business and professional 
contact which membership on the Board provides. White realtors 
claim that blacks are free to join (even a few blacks agree) but 
generally decline to do so. One black realtor, however, says 
that the reason has to do with the reality that black realtors 
remain tied to the black housing market making white real estate 
contacts relatively worthless (Curls interview, 1978). Their 
absence, nevertheless, prevents needed communication between black 
and white realtors and the possibility of opening up the white 
housing market to blacks. Continued exclusion insulates realtors 
on the basis of race; black views are not shared and realtor 
codes advocating segregation go largely unchallenged. 
Another long standing practice by all realty firms in Kansas 
City which provides further evidence that segregation will not 
soon end is the total absence of black realtors working for white 
firms and white realtors working for black firms. Once again, 
realtors claim that this is a matter of good business rather than 
a question of race. To again quote Robert Moore, Jr. : " ••• real 
estate companies in Kansas City have a nearly perfect record of 
segregated hiring. Why? Quite simple--the broker associates ~, 
himself with people who will be acceptable to the seller and 
b · ( J 9 1978•23) Thi's presents a self-uyer client" KC Star, une , • • 
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fulfilling prophecy: as long as there is housing segregation, 
real estate practices will also remain segregated; more important-
ly, as long as the real estate industry remains segregated, 
housing segregation will persist. 
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CHAPTER 5 - RACIAL COVENANTS AFTER SHELLEY AND BARROWS 
The general opinion after Shelley was that even though 
racial covenants no longer had any legal effect, segregated 
housing would continue to survive for a long time (Scanlon, 
1948:157). This has proven true. In its 1968 report on 
racial isolation, the USCCR said that 
••• covenants were private agreements to exclude 
members of designated minority groups, the fact that 
they were enforceable by the state and federal courts 
gave them maximum effectiveness ••• Although racially 
restrictive covenants no longer are judicially enforce-
able, they are still used and the patterns they helped to 
create still persist (21). 
A recent law journa·l article also points out that during the 
years following Shelley, it was the common belief that pur-
chasers were still willing to pay more for lots in "exclusive" 
subdivisions which purported to be .p~otected by racial cove-
nants (Maryland Law Review Notes, 1974:403). Furthermore, most 
laymen-grantees had never even heard of Shelley or Barrows and 
the average person was therefore hesitant to breach the face of 
the title deed. The article goes on to say that it was not 
uncommon to continue recording racial covenants and this acted 
to re-inforce the notion of the gentlemen's agreement; that is, 
without lawful racial covenants, the parties involved in hous-
ing transactions often relied upon private "understandings." 
This practice gained its legitimacy through the observance of 
racial covenants (Weaver, 1948:240). By the time the racial 
covenant was made unlawful, the gentlemen's agreement had become 
so deeply engrained throughout our country that it was a powerful 
exclusionary custom. In hearings before the USCCR 
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in 1961, the conclusion was that Shelley did not eliminate de 
facto segregation in housing. Rather, the Supreme Court simply 
relegated the restrictive covenant to the enforcement by gentle-
man's agreement, a practice which they found to be widespread. 
Girard Bryant, a well known retired black educator and 
long-time resident of Kansas City, Missouri, poignantly des-
cribed the power of gentleman's agreanent (Interview, 1978). 
Bryant and his wife were close friends with a white couple liv-
ing at 55th and Main in Kansas City, Missouri. They often shared 
dinner at each others home and so on. When the white couple 
put their house up for sale in the late 1960s, another black 
couple tried to purchase it. Bryant's white fri.ends could still 
not go through with the sale due to their fear of its effect on 
the neighborhood and what everyone would think of their actions. 
Racial covenants after Shelley caused other problems, as 
well. During the 1963 hearings for the Kansas Conference on 
Discrimination in Real Property, Samuel Jackson, the then Presi-
dent of the Topeka Branch of the. NAACP, testified that even 
though restrictive covenants were unenforceable, they still 
served to harrass blacks who wanted to buy property, primarily 
because most property sti.11 ha.s the restrictive covenant in 
the chain of title. Jackson testified that 
many title insurance companie~ in.the state, and s7veral 
of the mortgage lending agencies in the state require 
Negro buyers to ••• file a quiet tit;e ••• this runs any~here 
from $250 to $300, or $400, depending upon what al~ is 
involved or to post a bond to assure that there will be 
money av~ilable to the title insurance ~om~any, o: to the 
mortgage lending agency, to defend a suit if one is.brought 
by someone who will want to try to en~orce the particular 
covenant ••• legislation is needed to wipe out anr legal 
effect that covenants may have or to prevent sui·ts ••• that 
are brought solely for the purposes of harrassment. 
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In this regard, Title companies continued to abstract racial 
covenants until November 26, 1969, when the Civil Rights Division 
of the Justice Department brought pressure on them by writing 
each company a letter stating that the continuance of such 
actions would violate the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Plager, 1970: 
138). This did not, however, remove racial clauses from the 
thousands of deeds that were previously recorded: clauses which 
remain on much of the residential property today. 
Another question Shelley did not clearly answer was the 
presence of "reverter" clauses in many of the covenants. As 
described earlier, if a covenant is violated land reverts auto-
matically to the original owner. Shelley created a conflict 
because the Court ruled that even though racial restrictions 
were unenforceable, the reverter clause was still operationali 
it could not, however, have race as its motive. Blacks never-
theless still had to demonstrate that the reverter clause was 
used against them because of their color (Jackson testimony, 
1963). In other words, the burden of proof was on blacks. 
The ·cha·rlo'tte p:a·rk :and" Recre·atio•n -Commission V'. ·Barr•inger 
case in 1955 illustrates how the courts view of reverter 
clause.~: -mt9ht cause concern to blacks (88 S. E. 2d 114 (1955)) • 
The granter gave the city of Charlotte a golf course and the 
deed contained a racial restriction prohibiting blacks. The 
question the courts had to answer was whether the land would 
revert back to the granter if the course was used by blacks. 
The court ruled that since the land. reverted automatically, 
there was no "state action" involved in the discrimination. 
Thus the 'Shelley doctrine was again ,?circumvented. The court 
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had made a clear distinction between the automatic reverter 
clause and a racially restrictive covenant. 
THE 1968 FAIR HOUSING ACT, JONES AND MAYERS 
Another pressing question was left unanswered by Shelley 
and Barrows: the conflict between the state's responsibility 
for private discrimination under the equal protection clause and 
the rights of privacy and free association or non~association 
under the 14th Amendment. There was general agreement that 
Shelley clearly could not prevent individuals from barring 
blacks from purchasing a home (Henkin, 1962:501). In other 
words, Shelley did not prevent private or individual discrimin-
ation. It took more than 20 years before the uneasy relation-
ship between discrimination and voluntary racial covenants was 
seriously addressed by the government and the courts. 
First came the passage of the 1968 Housing Act. Among 
other things the Act prohibited the 
••• mak[ing], print[ing] or publish[ing] ••• any notice, 
statement or advertisement, with respect to the sale or 
rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, 
limitation or discrimination based on race, color, 
religion or national origin ••• (42 u.s.c 3604 (c) (1970)). 
The question here is whether the courts would view a racial cove-
nant as a "notice, statement or advertisement"which falls 
under the Act. No clear answer is provided in the language of 
the Act, which was directed at the real estate industry rather 
than individuals; thus private discrimination was still possible • 
. ,.,, The u. s. Supreme Court reviewed this question in Jones v. 
l 
Mayer, (392 u.s. 409 (1968)). On September 2, 1965, Jones, et 
al., filed a complaint in the District Court for the Eastern 
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District of Missouri, alleging that Mayers, et al., had refused 
to sell them a home in the Paddock Woods community of St. Louis 
County for the sole reason that Jones was black. Jones relied 
on Section 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act which declared that 
all citizens of the United States shall have the same 
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by 
white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, 
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property 
(42 u.s.c. 1982). 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that 
Sec. 1982 bans all racial discrimination, private as 
well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and 
that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of 
the power of Congress to enforce the thirteenth Amend-
ment. 
The Court sought, therefore, to ban "private" action that allowed 
property to be placed on the market for "whites only" thus 
giving them a right which was denied to blacks. 
Subsequent decisions upheld the Jones ruling. In Lee v. 
Minnock, it was held that Sec. 1982 has broad reach and pro-
hibits all racially motivated discrimination in the sale or 
rental of property, whether private or public.(417 F~Supp. 436 
(1976)). The--ruling..was further broadened.in Fair Housing 
esanciL. v~ Bercjen county Multiple Listing Service, (422 F.Supp. 
1071 (1976)). In this instance, the black plaintiffs success-
fully argued that multiple listing services and racial steering 
constitute a sufficient cause of action under Sec. 1982. 
Sec. 1982 was narrowly viewed, however, in Drain v. Friedman 
(422 F.Supp. 366 (1976)), when the Court would not impose an 
aff~rmative duty on a private landlord to accept low-income 
tenants absent evidence that the landlord's motivation is racial 
rather than economic in origin. 
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Despite extending the meaning of Shelley, the Jones Doctrine 
and the 1968 Housing Act failed to quiet discussion over the con-
tinuing presence of racial covenants in the record books. Did 
their presence, though unenforceable, still inhibit black home 
buyers? Do they remain a psychological barrier of discouragement 
to black movement into white areas? Do they tend to encourage 
further or continued white resistence? Finally, should the courts 
consider the adverse psychological effect on blacks who are ex-
posed to such demeaning language? 
The Supreme Court addressed these issues in a couple of non-
housing cases in the early 1960s: Lombard v. Louis (363 u.s. 
267) and Peterson v. City of Greenville (363 U.S. 244) The 
Court ruled in these cases that 
the mere existence of Jim Crow laws may have a coercive 
effect upon present private choice, and that, in a social 
setting where the populace is unlikely to consider them 
as 'invalid,' it is not unfair to presume they have this 
effect (Fiss, 1964-65:586). · 
Then in 1968, a three-judge panel applied the same reasoninging 
they enjoined the keeping of separate tax records by race, stating 
that "the keeping of public records according to race, absent 
a legitimate public purpose ••• is itself ••• an indignity upon the 
minority group ••• " (Bryant v. State Board of Assessment (293 F. 
Supp. 1379). None of these cases, however, concerned racial 
covenants directly, but in 1972, the same questions were raised 
in that regard in Mayers v. Ridley (465 F.2d 630). 
In Mayers, a group of homeowners in Washington, D.C. sought 
an injunction against the recording of deeds containing racial 
covenants. They also asked that .all deeds which "incorporate" 
prior covenants by reference be stricken £ran the record. Mayers charged 
that the government was involved in, and encouraged, racial 
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discrimination because the files of the recorder's office are 
open to the public, are free of charge, and provide the con-
tents for every deed. In effect, Mayer's claimed that the gov-
vernment converted a private act (the writing and recording of 
a racial covenant) into a public act. In doing so, the govern-
ment was publicly endorsing the offensive language found in the 
majority of the covenants on file at the recorder's office. 
Central to Mayer's argument was whether the presence of racial 
covenants continues to inhibit blacks from moving into certain 
areas of a city. 
Mayers further argued that when a person buys a home, a trip 
to the recorder's office is made to check the title of the 
granter; when the purchase is concluded, another trip is made 
to have it recorded, gain priority, and protect against future 
conveyances by the granter. In this Wcr:i Mayers felt the recorde·r 
furnishes a vehicle by which racial predjudice is promulgated. 
He does this by putting the government seal on racist documents 
and this manifestly encourages private discrimination in vio-
lation of the 14th Amendment. 
The recorder claimed that the exclusion of the restrictive cove-
nant is not required by the Fair Housing Act of 1968 in that there 
was no "sale or rental of a dwelling" and also that the recorder 
is purely a ministerial officer (Ibid.,644). The district court 
agreed and dismissed Mayer's complaint. The District Court of 
Appeals affirmed, but on rehearing en bane, the full Court rejected 
the claim that homeowners suffered no harm on account of the "void 
covenants. The court reviewed the intention of t.i'1e U.S. Congress in passing 
the Fair Housing Act and determined that their intention was to 
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create a "national policy of open housing that would greatly 
facilitate movement of people free from the artificial barriers 
of racial restrictions" (Ibid., 564). 7 Consequently, the Circuit 
Court reversed and on remand ordered the recorder of deeds to 
place on the cover of every deed volume (where hundreds of deeds 
of all types are recorded) a label stating that "racial covenants 
are null and void and illegal under our laws." Due to the im-
practicality of handling millions of documents, the Court appar-
ently did not wish to make the recorder rescind each individual 
covenant, as Mayers had hoped, or provide that all prior covenants 
be re-recorded on the condition that they expressly exclude racial 
restrictions. 
It \'.lOuld appear t.liat Mayers answered any remaining questions 
left over from Shelley, Barrows, the Housing Act, and Jones, yet 
one legal writer feels that it did not. Burns believes that the 
state could have argued that because so few people discover the 
offensive language in their covenants (for example, how many 
people actually go to the trouble to check them?), the effect is 
insignificant (Burns, 1972:159). Secondly, Burns wonders if the 
racial clause could void the entire deed and therefore not pro-
vide "constructive notice" to purchasers, thus leaving them 
unknowingly subject to future lawsuits. On the other hand, could 
the offensive racial clause be treated as void and read out of 
the deed, as was done prior to Mayers as a result of Shelley 
(Ibid.)? 
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CHAPTER 6 - RESULTS OF THE SURVEY OF RACIAL COVENANTS 
An explanation was given in.the introduction regarding the 
most effective method of illustrating the coverage of racial 
covenants in the KCMR. The following assumption was made: if but 
one dwelling within a subdivision was racially restricted, then 
the entire subdivision· was considere·d restricted. The first 
impression may be that this is an extreme assumption. It does 
raise the obvious question: how could blaQks be excluded from 
unrestricted housing within a subdivision that contained only 
a few racial covenants, perhaps only one? 
The rationale for the assumption is plausible for several 
reasons. First, it is well documented that blacks were acutely 
aware of the existence of racial restrictions throughout white 
areas, as noted in the foregoing pages. They were also aware that 
law suits were filed to enforce the restrictions. Of equal impor-
tance is the fact that they could not be certain as to the exact 
location of the. restrictions without checking the_ title deeds 
to.each piece of property. There was no simple way to connnuni-
·cate this information to black home buyers. Most people found 
out about housing opportunities through newspaper ads, realtors, 
or word of mouth. For blacks, such information was restricted 
to black locations with one possible exception. As Robert Weaver 
concluded in 1948, blacks often found willing white sellers in 
transitional areas who were not d~t~rred by racial covenants: 
lawsuits occurred when white neighbors cared and had no intention 
of leaving the area (239). Information that blacks were excluded 
came quickly to those who sought housing in all-white neighbor-
hoods. 
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Secondly, the courts were not at all clear regarding what 
constitutes a "white district." The courts vaguely discuss 
"neighborhoods," "sections," and "districts." Normally these 
definitions pertain to only a few blocks of houses. The survey 
for this thesis is concerned with subdivisions, which can con-
sist of only a few homes or several hundred. The majority view 
of the courts in Missouri, and elsewhere, was that 100 percent 
of the signatures in a "district" not needed to achieve 
complete coverage of the restrictions. The more important con-
sideration was always the number of white people living within 
the district; in other words, as long as the district was ruled 
a white district, it was considered a restricted district. Once 
the conditions began to change, as in transitional areas, the 
courts would say at some point, that it was a "Negro" district. 
The implications of this are clear: the only areas not restricted 
to black occupancy were the areas in which blacks were already 
living, or those neighborhoods bordering the black district. 
Finally, the mere fact that the courts were likely to rule un-
~avorably or that their position was uncertain, at best, was 
probably enough to dissuade many blacks from testing new neigh-
borhoods, particularly those removed from the black section. 
Third, in the absence of covenants, blacks were persuaded 
not to enter white residential areas with the hope of finding 
housing because of intense racial hostility toward those who 
attempted it. At the same time, most of the violence occurred 
in ··::ransitional neighborhoods where covenants and other barriers 
.... ~\ 
to black movement had broken down. 
Fourth, restrictions on housing were but one means of 
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exclusion. As described earlier, each step in the search for 
housing in white areas was met by formal and informal racial 
agreements barring black occupancy. Realtors would not show them 
homes; lenders would not provide mortgage loans; community pres-
sure prohibited sales. In short, numerous obstacles stood in the 
path of black residential movement eliminating any chance of 
finding housing in an unrestricted location. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the conclusion of this 
thesis is in agreement with what Robert ·weaver wrote regarding 
the coverage of racial covenants more than 30 years ago. 
Much time has been wasted in attemping to prove that all 
housing not occupied by Negroes is covered by racial cove-
nants. This is not true. It is, in fact, not very impor-
tant. The significant thing is the pattern of coverage of 
restrictive agreements (1948:255). 
In this respect, the "pattern of coverage" of restrictive agree-
ments in the KCMR is as follows. The writing of racial cove-
nants was first used in exclusive housing developments and is 
an upper-class innovation. The custom quickly filtered down to 
middle-income neighborhoods that were seeking "respectability," 
and then eventually reached low-income subdivisions, as well. 
All of the desirable "upper-class" housing surrounding black 
sections was effectively covered by racial covenants. This in-
cludes such neighborhoods as Hyde Park, Coleman Heights, Valan-
tine, etc., mostly to the west of the main black section, the 
Bowery. Middle class neighborhoods were not completely covered, 
but were also closed to blacks because of intense racial hostil-
ity and strictly observed racial agreements within the real estate 
industry and mortgage lending institutions--all of which even-
tually broke down under the increasing need for black housing. 
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Generally, two basic patterns of coverage occurred in the 
KCMR. One type was written by individual homeowners and neigh-
borhood improvement associations. A second type was written by 
developers and large land owners in the rapidly growing suburbs. 
Each method, though sharing the same objective, had different 
characteristics. The first type was typically written in re-
sponse to potential black movement in middle class neighborhoods 
abutting black sections. The greater the perceived threat, the 
greater the number of restrictions. Although the covenants in 
these areas were ultimately unsuccessful in holding back black 
movement, they were successful in funneling the movement into 
housing where the least resistance was met. On the other had, 
areas that were the most heavily restricted, like Santa Fe Place, 
were not so easily penetrated, even though in the direct path of 
black movement. Blacks were thus inclined to move in a block 
by block fashion to the older, least desirable housing, with 
scattered restrictions preceeding this movement. The most in-
tensive campaigns of improvement associations occurred in such 
neighborhoods. 
The second type of restrictions, written by developers, were 
spread over a much greater land area. All of the homes in a sub-
division were included, often encompassing entire communities. 
Prairie Village, Roeland Park, and Leawood are good examples. 
Interestingly, these covenants were not inspired by the fear of 
black intrusion, but instead by the policies of lenders, realtors 
and developers •.. ,.The restrictions were recorded before any of the 
occupants had even moved into the homes. Although J.C. Nichols 
used this approach very early, it did not truly begin to 
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flourish until around 1935 and particularly after WWII. The 
central characteristic of this type of roverage is that the hanes were 
new when the restrictions were imposed and usually far removed 
from the neighborhoods experiencing any real tli.reat of black in-
filtration. Generally, covenants of this type blanketed all of 
northeast Johnson County and the southwest corridor of Kansas 
City, Missouri, extending south from the Plaza, Rockhill-Nelson 
area, west of Troost to State Line where the Johnson County, 
Kansas, restrictions were joined. Much of this area is covered 
by J.C. Nichols developments. By the 1940s, he had developed 
7,500 acres of residential housing with the southern boundary 
extended to 79th Street (Brown, 1978:176). 
The significance of the type of restrictions written for 
suburban housing is illustrated by Table 6, on the following 
page, compiled from a list of plats recorded from a three county 
area (Jackson and Clay Counties in Missouri: Johnson in Kansas) 
during the period of 1930 to 1947. The following conclusions 
were derived from the data: 
1) the majority of the plats (76%), in the three county 
sample contained racial restrictions. Particularly noteworthy 
is the 96 percent figure for Johnson County. 
2) plats which contained racial covenants comprised the 
majority of acreage for all recorded plats (82%). Again, Johnson 
County had an unusually high amount (96%). This tends to sub-
stantiate the pattern of large developments being blanketed with 
restrictions in the 1940s. 
3) the average acreage for restricted plats is twice as large 
as that for unrestricted plats. Clearly, the practice of resrict-
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TABLE ·6 - RECORDED PLATS, 19 30 to 19 4 7: A COMP ARI SON OF RESTRICTED AND 
UNRESTRICTED PLATS FOR JACKSON, CLAY, AND JOHNSON COUNTIES. 
- Total plats recorded 
- Number of plats without 
racial restrictions 
- Number of plats containing 
racial restrictions 
- Percentage of plats filed 
containing racial restrictions 
- Total acreage of all plats 
- Total acreage of plats without 
racial restrictions 
- Total acreage of plats containing 
racial restrictions 
- Percentage of acreage without 
racial restrictions 
- Percentage of acreage containing 
racial restrictinns 
- Average acreage of 
unrestricted plats 



















































(Source: Plat Books at the Recorder of Deeds Offices for· the restpective 
Counties.) 
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ing large tracts of land had become much more common during this 
period. 
It is important to add that Table 6 does not include most of 
the year 1947 and none of the years thereafter through 1950, a 
period of intense building activity in the KCMR, especially in 
northeast Johnson County and southwest Kansas City, Missouri. 
The data regarding racial restrictions would therefore undoubtedly 
be even more dramatic, although the basic patterns would most 
likely remain the same. 
The same pattern of racial restrictions blanketing newer sub-
divisions was also found in a survey compiled in New York in 1947. 
Of 315 new developments in Queens, Nassau, and Southern Westches-
ter, it was found that the incidence of racial covenants in the 
older parts of the city were low, but newer subdivisions and sub-
urban areas were well covered. 
Race covenants applied to a few small developments; but 
they were frequent on the large;scale building operation. 
Only eight percent of the developments with less than 20 
homes were restricted against Negroes, compared with nearly 
one half (48%) of the subdivisions of 20 homes or more. 
Among large developments of 75 properties or more, five-
sixths were race restricted ••• No less than 56 percent of 
all homes checked were forbidden to Negroes (Dean, 1947: 
428). 
The conclusion of this thesis is in agreement with the New York 
findings: suburban subdivisions in the KCMR were significantly 
larger than those adjacent to the black section and they were much 
more likely to be heavily covered with racial restrictions. 
Information from surveys taken in other cities to determine 
the coverage of racial agreements is sketchy. Those available, 
however, verify the KCMR survey findings. For example, surveys 
in Columbus, Ohio, and Chicago found that the greatest concentra-
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tion of racial restrictions was in middle-class areas surround-
ing "black-belts," with a tendency toward widespread coverage in 
newer suburban subdivisions (Weaver, 1948:246). Much residen-
tial property and some rather large vacant sites were not restric-
ted, however. Data supplied for the 1947 Tovey v. Levy racial 
covenant case in Chicago support these findings. For the 155 
sections or square miles surveyed in Chicago for the case, the 
following conclusions were reached (Ibid.): 
- 70 sections were non-residential 
- 85 sections were residential 
- nine and one half sections were occupied by blacks 
- 37 1/2 sections were assigned to residential use free of 
racial covenants. 
- 38 sections assigned to residential use were restricted 
against black occupancy 
In summary, 44 percent of all residential land was restricted, 
while blacks occupied only 10.6 percent of the residential land. 
Figure 7 on the following page reveals this pattern. 
By using the Chicago method of analysis for Kansas City, 
Missouri, the following data provide an interesting comparison. 
Quarter sections are used rather than full sections. out of the 
total of 272 quarter sections surveyed (68 square miles), the 
following conclusions were reached: 
- 62 quarter sections were devoted almost exclusively 
to industrial or commercial use. 
- 14 quarter sections were occupied almost exclusively by 
the black population. 
:;, - 52 quarter sections were non~restricted residential pro-
perty. 
- 158 quarter sections were restricted against black occupancy. 
FIGURE 7 - DISTRIBUTION OF RACIAL COVENANTS IN CHICAGO, 
ILLINOIS. 
1bla chart II al!'lpted from a map prepaffl! by the Chicago Branch of the 
National Aaociation for the Advancmient o( Coloffl! People and bued on 
a 1urvey made b7 Loring B. Moore. 
1,16 . 
FIGURE 8. - DISTRIBUTION OF RACIAL "COVENANTS · BY QUARTER 
SECTION IN KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI: 













The Kansas City, Missouri data may be summarized as follows: 
75 percent of the total residential land was restricted, while 
only four percent of the residential land surveyed was occupied 
by blacks. 
Figures 9 through 13 are county maps that illustrate the 
final results of the six county metropolitan survey. It should 
be noted that the construction of the maps was based upon the 
period in which the racial restrictions were written, roughly 
1914 to the early 1950s. The last restrictions were written in 
the late 1960s, however, and they, too, are included. Many of 
the areas that indicate residential development,·especially in 
downtown Kansas City, Missouri, are now commercial. 
They are nevertheless considered here as residential areas. 
Similarly, many of the areas that are called "non-residential" on 
the maps do not accurately represent development as it appears 
today. Nor do the maps accurately portray development as of 1950. 
Instead, they represent residential growth and racial covenant 
coverage as it would appear by combining a 40 year period. This 
accounts for the rather heavy coverage of restrictions indicated 
for some locations where housing does not exist today; naturally, 
industry and commerce have expanded. Also, note that many of the 
areas in which blacks lived, as of 1950, were covered by racial 
agreements. 
Most of the conclusions from the survey have already been 
discussed. Special attention should be given to the maps depic-
ting Johnson county and Jackson County and the areas running 
along state Line Avenue where "exclusive" Nichols developments 
dominated. These include the country Club District, Mission Hill~, 
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FIGURE 9 - DISTRIBUTION OF RACIAL COVENANTS IN JACKSON 
COUNTY, MISSOURI, KANSAS CITY PORTION 
- Racially restricted housing : 1950 
- Non-restricted housing: 1950 
housing : 1950 
Scale : 
1/2 inch= one mile 





FIGURE 10 - DISTRIBUTION OF RACIAL COVENANTS IN JACKSON 
COUNTY, MISSOURI, INDEPENDENCE PORTION 
Scale: 1/2 inch= 
0 1 2 3 








FIGURE 11 - DISTRIBUTION OF RACIAL COVENANTS IN JOHNSON 
COUNTY, KANSAS 
- Racially restricted housing: 195n 
- Non-restricted housing: 1950 D 
- Non-residential land: 1950 
D 
' l~--~>-.--:~.,....:,i.~~~:..--->~.1->.c~~t'v-._---t )' 
I-435 
Scale: 
0 1 2 3 
1/2 inch= one mile 
121 






·- . - -·· -~-- - ---·· ------~---· ... ------=-'"-'"-"'"· ,,_., __ 
WYANDOTTE COUNTY 




- Racially restricted housing: 1950 
- Non-restricted housing: 1950 
- Non-residential housing: 1950 
Scale: 1/2 inch• one mile 
0 1 2 3 
FIGURE 13 - DISTRIBUTION OF RACIAL COVENANTS IN CLAY AND 
PLATTE COUNTIES, MISSOURI 
PLATTE AND CLAY COUNTIES 
- Racially restricted housing: 1950 D 
D 
Scale: 
0 1 2 3 
1/2 inch= one mile 
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and Leawood (developed by the Kroh Brothers). These communities 
provided a formidable economic barrier to blacks, acting as a 
buffer to other less expensive homes located in Praire Village, 
Roeland Park, Shawnee, and Overland Park. Although the homes 
here were more modestly priced, they were totally restricted, 
all-white communities. 
After Shelley blacks began to move across formerly forbidden 
boundaries in record numbers. Surveys taken three years after 
Shelley in 1951 indicate that a sizeable number of blacks had 
moved beyond the 1948 boundaries separating blacks from whites 
in both Chicago and Detroit (New York Times, January 22, 1951 
and April 15, 1951). The same pattern was occurring in other 
cities, including Kansas City, Missouri, where blacks were rapidly 
moving southeastward, the direction of movement that still exists 
today. Segregation, however, did not change and blacks were not 
entering suburban locations. Past legal segregation remained 
fixed and stabilized. In fact, the level of segregation is 
greater today than it was in 1950 (USCCR, 1975). Blacks were 
continuing the block by block pattern of movement. This is 
illustrated in figure 14 through 16 which compares the 1950 loca-
tion of blacks in Kansas City, Missouri, with those of 1960 and 
1970. Note the distinct growth of the black district and its 
failure to penetrate Troost Avenue. Figures 17 and 18 compare 
black movement in Kansas City, Kansas, in 1940 with 1968 and 
reveal the same characteristics found in Kansas City, Missouri; 
movement is basically to the northeast. 
Why have blacks not moved into suburban locations, particu-
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FIGURE 16 LOCATION OF BLACK POPULATION IN 
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FIGURE·l7 - BLACK LOCATION IN KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, 1940 
IC&LI. IN HILi, 8 
R .F .. M ... • OVER 80~ NEGP.O LJ INTEGRATED OR TRAN.SITION 
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FIGURE 18 - BLACK LOCATION IN KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, 1968 
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this thesis is that the effect of racial agreements, both on 
individual property deeds and within the policies of the var-
ious actors involved in the housing industry, continued to act 
as the principal barrier to black suburban movement after 1950. 
Since Johnson County received the greatest population growth in 
the KCMR from 1950 to 1980, it provides the most useful example 
illustrating the continuing effect of racial agreements. 
Sometime after WWII, whites began to leave Kansas City, 
Missouri, and many of them were moving to Johnson County. 
Table 7, below, shows the population growth for Kansas City, 
Missouri, from 1900 to 1970. In order to maintain constancy of 
geographical. boundaries over the years, annexations, which largely 
occurred after 1950, are not included. 
















1930 1940 1950 1960 
399,746 399,178 430,534 385,797 
357,741 357,346 374,570 301,170 
42,005 41,832 55,964 83,654 






* other races -were included with· blacks prior to 1960, but not for 1960 and 19 70 • 
The white population peaked in 1950 at 374,570. By 1960, almost 
74,000 whites had fled the City; by 1970 another 105,000 had left. 
(The same pattern was occurring in Kansas City, Kansas.) Yet the 
black population was steadily increasing. Preliminary reports 
from the. 19 BO Census indicate a continuation of thi.s pattern 
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(KC Star, July 13, 1980). 
Blacks, however, were moving to Johnson County in a trickle. 
The first black family did not move to northeastern Johnson 
County (where the bulk of the County's population lives) until 
1967 (Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1969:1). The entire 
black population for Johnson County in 1980 is still expected 
to be below one percent of the County's 262,000 residents 
{KC Star, February 3, 1980). There were 810 blacks_ counted in 
the 1900 Census for Johnson County and, remarkably, only 1,031 
by 1970. This is compared to an increase in the total popula-
tion over the same period from 18,100 to 216,876. The County's 
black popula~ion remains largely confined to the same two loca-
tions where blacks have been living since the turn of the cen-
tury: Olathe and Merriam. These two areas account for more than 
60 percent of the total County population, or 634 blacks. 
The most common arguments against the claim of this thesis, 
that racial agreements provided the basis for continued exclu-
sion of blacks in Jonnson County, are the two theories expressed 
brie.f ly in the introduction: income and ethnicity. The fallowing 
analysis is therefore given in order to dispel their importance 
as primary factors in halting black movement into Johnson County. 
THE "INCOME THEORY 
Numerous scholars have recently downplayed the importance of 
the income theory. Political scientist Gary Orfield concludes 
that patterns of segregation cannot easily be explained by diff-
erences in income, nor can a rise in income provide a remedy 
{.19-77: 46·t. In accordance, the USCCR in a 1977 report states 
that statistical analyses of residential patterns suggest that 
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economic differences account for only a small part of the expla-
nation of racial separation (161. Noted demographer Karl Taeuber 
estimates that no more than 20 to 25 percent of the racial segre-
gation that exists in metropolitan areas can be attributed to 
economic factors (1975: 818). Moreover, Reynolds Farley, another 
well known authority on segregation, found that well-to-do whites 
are far more segregated from affluent black families than 
they are from poor white families (1975:167). Not surprisingly, 
therefore, whether below or above the poverty income level, a 
much. greater proportion of blacks than whites lived in poverty 
areas in 1970, both inside and outside of metropolitan areas 
(U.S. Census,_ 1972:Table BL Furthermore, low-income whites 
living in metropolitan areas were distributed equally between 
central cities and suburban areas, while for blacks the ratio 
was five to one (U.S. Census, 1973:10.-11).. 
In 19_70, if blacks had been distributed by income between 
Detroit and its suburbs the same way whites were, 67 percent of 
the black ;families would have. been suburbanites (Cottingham, 
1975:273-29-6.L. A 19.75 study reported that the average white 
family with. an income. below the poverty line lives in a neigh-
borhood witn. a nigher me.dian income than a typical black family 
earning more than $24,000 (Orfield, 1977 :481. The same study 
found tfiat Black professionals and managers live in neighborhoods 
where most workers are unskilled or semiskilled, while whites 
in similar Brackets live in camnmities with few such workers (Ibid.) • 
Similar findings nave prompted Chester Rapkin to conclude that 
tne 11 degree. o_f discrimination appears to increase markedly as 
b.lacRs approach 111iddle--class status" (.19.69.: 1201. In conclusion, 
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if people were residentially distributed on the basis of the hous-
ing they can afford, rather than according to skin color, the 
current level of residential segregation would be quite low 
(Farley, 1975:167). 
In view of the above, if limited income were the only barrier 
to black housing choice in Johnson County, then blacks could be 
expected to have a much higher rate of homeownership in white 
areas, if those homes were within the median black income. It 
is often assumed that 0 affluent" Johnson County remains largely 
white because the housing costs are beyond the reach of most 
blacks (Curls and Wimmes interviews, 19781. This is, in fact, 
not so. By using 1970 census data, Table 8 on page 134 
reveals that the majority of housing in several Johnson County 
communities is well within the reach of median income blacks. 
Tlie 19.70 median income for black families in the Kansas City 
urbanized area was $7,226 (.U.S. Census, Table 76}_. Before cur-
rent inflationary changes, realtors generally felt the ceiling 
for tlie purchase price of a home was two and one-half times the 
family income. Therefore, the median-income black family from 
Kansas City, Missouri, could purchase a home valued at $18,065. 
By using tliese guidelines, Table 8 shows that for several nearly 
all-whi.te Johnson County communities the majority of housing was 
valued at under $20., 000. and a significant amount was valued at 
less than $15,00.0. Figure 19 on page l.33 shows the housing value 
by census tract. These figures_ gain further credibility if one 
dri,res through. some of the neighborhoods in these communities. 
,t\ . 
Block after block of modestly sized homes are visible. Most of 
tlie. larger l'OOre expensive homes in the County were built after 
tlie mid-1960s. 
..i -· ••· 
FIGURE 19 - DISTRIBUI'ION BY CENSUS TRACT OF HOOSING VAWED AT LESS 
THAN $20,000 IN JOHN&N OOUNI'Y, I<ANSAS: 1970 
a-0-20• 





TABLE 8 - PERCENTAGE OF HOUSING VALUED AT LESS THAN $20,000 
AND $15,000 IN SELECTED INCORPORATED CITIES OF 
JOHNSON COUNTY, KANSAS: 1970 
Olathe 2,664 1,815 (68%) 1,120 (42 %) 
Prairie Village 7,290 2,902 (39 %) 634 ( 9%) 
Shawnee 4,056 2,317 (57%) 1,238 (31%) 
Merriam 2,228 1,228 (55%) 588 (26%) 
Roeland Park 2,460 1,810 (74%) 896 (36%) 
(Source: U.S. Census) 
THE ETHNICITY THEORY 
As for the ethnicity argument, Myrdal suggested in 1944 
that other ethnics formed colonies in the poorest parts of 
town, but after a few generations they became assimilated 
and "tend to disregard ethnic affiliation in seeking resi-
dence and pay more attention to personal needs and ability 
to pay rent ••• Negroes ••• are kept aliens permanently" (1944:620). 
More recently, several well known scholars have agreed with 
this position (Kane, 1975: Farley, 1975: Taeuber, 1975). 
Although Kansas City does not have the ethnic variety of 
many cities, their Italian community provides some support 
for the above view. The first Italians came to Kansas City 
just before the turn of the century and settled in the "North 
End" in an area bounded by First Street, Admiral, Oak and 
Tracy (See figure 1). Nearly all of them lived north of 
Independence Avenue (City Development Department, KCMO., 1969: 
4). By 1918, the Italian population living in this area was 
estimated at 12,000 ("Ibid.). It continued to grow until 
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quotas on immigration were set by congress in 1924. Many 
Italians then started to move to the northeast of the core 
area and met some resistance from the white residents who lived 
there. Racial covenants were written in this area, in some 
instances against Italian occupancy, and the same pattern of 
refusing to sell until a block was broken prevailed (Ibid.). 
Yet they faced far less discrimination than blacks and their 
problems were generally confined to their lack of skills 
and difficulty with the language (Ibid.). Within a few gener-
ations, they had become, for the most part, assimilated 
throughout the KCMR, although today there remains a small 
identifiable core area of the old Italian community (KC Star, 
July 30, 1978). 
John Kain has studied this question as thoroughly as 
anyone and concludes that 
the current intensity of Negro residential segregation 
is greater than that documented for any other identi-
fiable racial or ethnic group in American history and 
that in contrast to the experience of ethnic groups, who 
experience rapid dispersal from their original ethnic 
concentrations, black Americans have become more rather 
than less segregated with time (1975:23). 
Much of the discussion in this thesis has been in regard 
to the growing acceptance and solidification of racial cove-
nants and agreements prior to 1950 and.their continuing effect. 
The proposition throughout has been that segregation was not 
"exclusively" a voluntary choice. Rather, the practice of 
writing racial covenants on private property, more importantly, 
the institutionalization of policies upholding racial agreements 
by everyone involved in housing transactions, insured that 
blacks would be deprived of the majority of housing within 
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our cities. Without such constraints, the high level of 
segregation so characteristic today would not be nearly so 
pervasive. Racial agreements, in the broadest sense of the 
term, remain a part of the majority of housing decisions 
involving blacks, even though they are "unlawful." Whites 
do not bomb blacks out of their neighborhoods anymore, although 
their presence still tends to cause some hostility. Discrimination 
today is less explicit and therefore much harder to clearly 
identify any one single cause or force. The legacy remains 
because segregation has become a way of life. Thomas Schelling 
hypothesizes that once a pattern is established, people will 
choose to maintain it, many times even if they disapprove of 
it; choice is constrained (1975:82). He also writes about the 
difficulty individuals encounter when they have to choose 
between polarized extremes; for example, a white neighborhood 
or a black one. When confronted by such a choice, individuals 
will reinforce the segregation. As a consequence, broadening 
choice will remain as issue for generations to come. 
APPENDIX A 
THE RECORDING OF RACIAL COVENANTS 
All restrictive covenants are recorded at the Recorder of 
• Deed's Office located at the courthouse of each respective 
county seat. There are several ways retrictive covenants can 
be found. The easiest place to find restrictions is to look 
in the Plat Books. They give a planned layout of lot dimen-
sions, street locations, and so forth, of a subdivision or 
plat. Not all restrictions, however, are recorded directly 
upon the plat itself; this is left to the filer's discretion. 
The practice of placing restrictions with the plat was quite 
common in the 1920s and then less so in the 1930s. After WWII, 
many developers again chose this method and today nearly all 
plats seem to also contain a listing of restrictions. 
A second way of recording restrictions is to place them 
directly in the title deed or warranty deed. A ~arranty deed 
is an instrument for the conveyance of fee title. The owner 
of property always signs the deed and the deed ~ay cover num-
erous transactions. It must, however, always convey a title 
to something (Harris interview, 1979). Warranty deeds could 
therefore be filed by any person or organization who held the 
title and maintained a co_ntinuing interest in a piece of 
property. They can also cover as much land as the conveyor 
wants; for example, an entire tract of land that is subdivided 
can be included in just one warranty deed. The title holders 
of such deeds were land companies or real estate firms who 
h9-ndle large tracts of land. County records in the KCMR show 
examples of whole sections of land being racially restricted 
by a single title or warranty deed--a powerful land control 
tool. 
Warranty deeds were usually restricted on the "first deed 
out," where the first owner of a piece of property agrees not 
to "transfer ..• premises to Negroes under forfeiture of agree-
ment." Other restrictions were sometimes included for such 
things as lot size, set backs, prohibitions against outhouses, 
and so forth. Prior to WWII, however, when restrictions for 
other matters were not as common, the restrictions were usually 
for the sole purpose of excluding blacks. 
A third method of recording restrictions occurs when the 
grantor and grantee sign a separate agreement quite apart from 
the actual title deed itself. In this case, various restric-
tions are drafted under the title "declaration of restrictions," 
and may be recorded in either the plat books, the record books, 
or both. A declaration of restrictions does not convey title 
but merely sets out certain restrictions for a specific piece 
of property (Ibid.). After WWII, this method was used exten-
sively in the KCMR, almost always by large land developers 
like J.C. Nichols, who also recorded his restrictions in every 
other conceivable place. 
METHOD OF DETERMINING IF A SPECIFIC SUBDIVISION OR LOT WITH A 
SUBDIVISION CONTAINS RACIAL RESTRICTIONS 
In order to look up restrictions, the name of a subdivision 
1 
or an individual developers name must be known and the year in 
which the restriction was first written. For an individual 
piece of property, the first step is therefore to locate the -, 
"first deed out." This is found by determining where the 
property is located and the subdivision within which it lies. 
Next, go to the "Plat Book Index" listing all subdivisions, 
find the one in question and go to the correct plat book where 
the date the plat was filed is given along with the name of 
the developer. Take this information to the "Granter Books" 
for the year in question. The granters are listed alphbeti-
cally. For the first deed out, the granter is either the sub-
division, the developer, or perhaps a bank. The name of the 
grantee is also listed along with a reference to either a 
warranty deed book and page where the restriction is found. 
Also, in the back of each granter book is a listing of every 
sbudivision which recorded restrictions for that year along 
with the book and page where they are found in the record 
book. 
APPENDIX B 
MEMORANDUM - ____ .., ____ -
T01 Commission Members 
FROM: Todd H. Pavela, Bxeeutive Director 
RE, Survey of Real Estate Advertising Practices 
DATE1 June 24, 1966 
As authorized by the Commission on May 24, 1966, I endea-
vored to ascertain the meaning of the phrase •available 
to anyoneu or "for anyone" or the use of dotted lines to 
which the allegation has been made that this type of 
advertising practice is meant to separate homes available 
to Negroes from those available to whites. Listed below 
are the. results of this survey based on the Want Ad section 
of the Kansas City, Kansas, Sunday, June 12, 1966 edition. 
As a matter of judgment and of honest verification, it 
was decided to make this survey in two parts, the first 
unofficial on the part of a volunteer and the second 
official in the name of the Commission on Ruman Relations. 
The volunteer contacted all real estate brokers who used 
the above mentioned advertising techniques~ Calla were 
made without reference to any official investigation. 
Considered by most real estate agents to be a potential 
white uninformed client there was no difficulty in receiv_ing 
information as to the meaning of the use of the dotted line 
or the meaning of the phrase "available to anyone•. The 
same real estate brokers were contacted four days later 
officially in the name of the Commission requesting the 
aame information. Although aubstantial verification of the 
unofficial inquiry was obtained, as suspected, brokers 
when dealing with an official investigation were markedly 
leas forthright in their explanation of the purpose of 
their unusual advertising techniques. 
Analyzing both unofficial and official calla and being 
informed of the previous use of the term •for colored" 
which now has apparently been superseded by the dotted line 
or the euphemism •for anyone". I am totally convinced that 
these advertising techniques are designed to separate through 
public advertising houses which may be sold to Negroes 
or other minority groups from houses which are available 
to white families only. 
NOTE1 The category •not called• indicates unable to reach 
the office or to have the office return the call. 
aBAL BS'l'ATS ADVIR'l'ISBMBNTS_acAHSAS CITY, JCANSAS, SUNDAY, JUNE 12, 1966 
ADVERTISING PRM:TICES SURVEY 
UNOFFICIAL INQUIRY 
Realty Broker "A• 
"For anyone• 
When he found out that the 
caller was white, he aaid, •aoney, 
you really wouldn't want that 
one.• It was located in a Negro 
area. '1'wo other locations in the 
aame ad ware in white areas and 
he would not aell them to Negroea. 
Another house was in a commercial 
area, which he would sell to 
either a white or Negro person, 
but ha stated that those listed 
as •Por anyone• were available 
primarily for Negroes. He stated 
that •we have the nicest colored 
folks here. We don't have a bit 
of trouble with our colored 
folks here. They don• t say a thing 
when we tell them a house 
open to them. They don't want 
to break into white areas.• 
Realty Broker •a• 
The caller was informed that 
this was an integrated area and 
that a Negro could buy there. 
Rone of the other listings ware 
available to Negroes. When asked 
if a Negro could buy one of the 
other homes (not listed as 
•for anyone•) she replied, •Not 
frcm us they wouldn't. We just 
represent the seller.• 
OFFICIAL INOUif:Y 
aealty Broker •A• 
•ror anyone• 
•Anyone• •••• the office manager 
indicated that the term waa sy-
nonymous with the old term •for 
colored only". He indicated that 
•for anyone• meant available to 
Begroea and where the term was 
not used meant restricted •ale 
to whites only. 
Realty Broker •s• 
The office receptionist •aid that 
•anyone• doean•t have any parti-
cular meaning aimply ~eaignated 
that the area was predaninantly 
11egro in character. When asked 
if Negroes would buy any of the 
houses not designated as for any-
one refused to answer. 
UNOFFICIAL INQUIRY OFFICI~L INOUIRY 
Realty Broker "C" Realty Broker "C" 
that Mpeople can interpret it anyway 
they want to ••• it saves people 
both time and trouble. Negroes 
can purchase houses below the 
The realtor informed the caller 
all of the homes below the line 
were in mixed or "completely 
colored" neighborhoods and were 
"open to colored." If a white 
person wanted to buy one of these 
homes, however, he could. Those 
listings above the line were not 
available to Negroes but "to 
white only if the seller says not 
to sell to colored." 
Realty Broker "D" 
Not called. 
Realty Broker ''E" 
The realtor gave the address of 
this home and inquired whether 
the caller was white or "colored" 
He said that those homes listed 
"For anyone" were for Negroes, 
while the other listings were 
only for white persons--ac-
cording to the wishes of the 
white sellers. There was no 
hesitation about his men-
tioning that "for anyone" meant 
for Negroes. 
line without any difficulty, but 
they would have 'difficulty 
purchasing homes above the line•.• 
Realty Broker "D" 
The office manager showed extreme 
hesitancy in discussing the matter. 
He said advertising methods were 
personal policy and not subject 
to any city ordinance, the result 
was refusal to cooperate with the 
survey. 
Realty Broker "E" 
Not able to be reached by phone. 
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